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The insurance industry continues to experience financial scandals despite increasing 
pressure to integrate sound governance practices. The purpose of this multiple case study 
was to explore the corporate governance strategies insurance business leaders used to 
support financial performance.  The targeted population consisted of 7 business leaders 
from 7 insurance companies in Austria who have used corporate governance strategies 
successfully to support financial performance. The conceptual framework of this study 
was the agency theory. Data for the study were gathered from face-to-face semistructured 
interviews and a review of company documents. The data were analyzed using Yin’s 5 
nonlinear interlinked steps for assembling, disassembling, reconvening, inferring, and 
formulating conclusions. Three themes emerged from the data analysis: the need for a 
robust risk-management system, effective internal control mechanisms, and consistent 
application and compliance with corporate governance principles and regulations. The 
implications for positive social change include the potential for business leaders in the 
local community to restore confidence in the stability and financial performance of the 
insurance industry by establishing corporate governance structures with a robust risk-
management system and processes that support transparency and accountability. 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study 
Background of the Problem 
Corporate governance is at the core of every institution. Corporate governance is 
the lifeline that ensures sustained profitability over time. Hsu and Wu (2014) asserted that 
companies with a higher percentage of directors were less likely to be embroiled in 
corporate scandal and failure. The role of a Board of Directors (BD) is essential. The 
other management comprises the executives who set the goals and objectives of a 
company. Within the last decade (2000s) there have been several notable financial crises 
where key corporate bodies and reputable firms have failed (Lee & Fan, 2014; Othman & 
Melville, 2016). Efforts to improve corporate governance by regulatory bodies in the 
Austrian listed companies aim at enhancing investor confidence in the Austrian Stock 
Exchange (Austrian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2015). Examples of improvements in 
corporate governance include the introduction of two regulations to the merger and 
acquisition markets. In addition, the Austrian legislator, the Austrian Financial Market 
Authority (FMA) enacted stronger measures to enhance the responsibility of the 
supervisory board and the external auditor (ABS, 2015). The solutions at improving 
corporate governance have not curtailed the recurring onslaught of one financial crisis 
after another. Instead, financial scandal continues to implicate and mire more companies 
with new cases bringing to the forefront an intense, vicious, and higher level of gross 
misconduct. Clearly, the instruments established to thwart financial misconduct and poor 




Financial scandal mires the insurance business environment as policymakers have 
vowed sweeping changes in corporate governance in the insurance industry to safeguard 
profits and protect more than a million policyholders (Voinea, 2015). Forty percent of 
financial advisers do not comply with the law when selling insurance policy and products 
(Miller & Yang, 2015). The general business problem is some business leaders fail to 
implement strategies to support sound corporate governance, which could impair 
financial performance. The specific business problem is some insurance business leaders 
lack corporate governance strategies to support financial performance.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the corporate 
governance strategies insurance business leaders use to support financial performance. 
The targeted population consisted of business leaders from seven insurance companies in 
the corporate sector in Austria who have used successful corporate governance strategies 
to support financial performance. Implications for positive social change include the 
potential to reduce negative influences from misgovernance that allow companies to 
remain profitable which is beneficial for employees and investors and the potential for 
continuing or widening access to insurance for residents, which allows investors and the 
local community to benefit from improved corporate governance.  Implications for 
positive social change also include the potential for provision of stable employment 
opportunities and the restoration of local community trust in insurance companies’ 
investment portfolios, which is beneficial to investors and the local community. With my 
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findings, I may enable positive social change by providing knowledge on the strategies 
that businesses may use to avoid financial scandal and support strong insurance 
institutions where investors, employees, and the local community have confidence in the 
stability and financial performance of the insurance industry.   
Nature of the Study 
The three broad categories of research methods are quantitative, qualitative, and 
mixed (Venkatesh, Brown, & Sullivan, 2016). I used the qualitative method. Qualitative 
researchers seek to gain a solid understanding of a particular organization or event (Özer, 
Ergun, & Yilmaz, 2015). Researchers that use the quantitative approach rely on statistical 
techniques to examine relationships or differences among dependent and independent 
variables to determine the relevance of a theory through testing hypotheses (Gergen, 
Josselson, & Freeman, 2015). As I was not examining the relationship between variables, 
I considered that the quantitative research method was not appropriate for this study of 
strategies for ensuring sound corporate governance to support financial performance. 
Researchers use qualitative and quantitative data using the mixed or hybrid research 
method (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). My research, which may resolve the strategies 
used by companies effective in enhancing corporate financial performance, does not 
include a dependent and independent variable that is subject to a hypothesis testing. My 
research focus was appropriate for the qualitative research method to explore the 
corporate governance Strategies that support financial performance for insurance 
business leaders.  
4 
 
Qualitative researchers use designs such as ethnographic, phenomenological, 
narrative, and case studies (Yin, 2013). The origin of the ethnographic approach is the 
field of anthropology where the focus was the study of groups or organizations' cultures 
(Cincotta, 2015). My study had no exploratory intention to understand groups’ cultures; 
consequently, the ethnographic design was not suitable for my study. Researchers use the 
phenomenological approach to address the meanings of subjective experiences of 
different people and their interpretation of the world; the subjectivity rendered the 
phenomenological approach inappropriate for my study. The case study is the exploration 
of a program, event, or activity (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). I conducted a multiple 
case study of selected companies in Austria to gain an understanding of corporate 
governance strategies insurance companies’ leaders use to support corporate financial 
performance. 
Research Question  
What strategies do insurance business leaders use for corporate governance to 
support financial performance? 
Interview Questions  
1. Who is responsible for strategic corporate governance within your 
organization? 
2. What strategies were used to ensure sound corporate governance of the 
organization? 
3. What are the strategies used to link strategic corporate governance and the 
internal control systems (ICS) within your organization? 
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4. What, if any, related strategies for human resource management are in place to 
curb poor corporate governance? 
5. What strategies were used to ensure that sound corporate governance leads to 
improved financial performance? 
6. What measures are in place to enhance compliance toward corporate 
governance? 
7. What additional information can you provide regarding strategies you use to 
ensure sound corporate governance to support financial performance? 
Conceptual Framework 
Agency theory is denotative of the principal-agent theory. Ross established the 
agency theory in 1973 (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; L'Huillier, 2014). 
Mitnick was responsible for the introduction of today’s prevalent concept that institutions 
form around agency (Mitnick, 1975). The two stakeholders are the principal and the 
agent with the principal as the shareholder and executives as the agent. The central 
proposition of this theory is that shareholders desire a maximization of their interest in a 
company when they invest capital, while the executive directs and manages the company 
with shareholders hopeful that the actions of executives are in the best interest of 
shareholders (Isaac, 2014).   
The agency theory links directly to corporate governance. Agency theory is the 
dominant and founding paradigm of corporate governance (L'Huillier, 2014). Agency 
theory is also central to corporate governance and is an enabler in the exploration of 
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strategies that business leaders in the insurance industry use to ensure sound corporate 
governance to support financial performance. 
Operational Definitions 
Agency theory: Agency theory is denotative of the classical theory of the 
relationship that exists between the principal or shareholder and the agents, or the senior 
executives and managers. The agency theory was originally considered an economics 
theory (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Glinkowska & Kaczmarek, 2015). 
Board of Directors (BD): BDs are the external corporate governance mechanism 
that business entities use to establish a governing body of individuals responsible for 
setting visions and strategic goals (Gebba, 2015). 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO): The CEO is the most senior corporate officer 
responsible for overseeing operations, policy implementation, and strategy (Chakraborty 
& Sheikh, 2015). 
Corporate Governance: Corporate governance is the mechanism that determines 
the manner in which management carries out its activities. In essence, corporate 
governance is the entire system that defines, directs, and controls a company (Abels & 
Martelli, 2013; Gebba, 2015). 
Corporate Financial Scandals: Corporate scandals are the intentional 
manipulation of books of account to falsify accounting information for financial gain 
(Jovanovic & Grujic, 2016; McMahon, Pence, Bressler, & Bressler, 2016). 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): CSR is the attempt to achieve a balance 
between the economic, environmental, and social imperatives without undue harm to the 
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wealth maximization interests of shareholders (Popa & Salanta, 2014). However, there is 
no universally agreed definition of the term CSR as the term includes ethics, sociology, 
economics, and management (Richter, 2011).  
Stewardship Theory: Stewardship theory is the hypothesis that business leaders 
guard the interest of shareholders and display self-sacrificing behavior (Hernandez, 
2012). The theory lends support to the view that managers create profitable entities that 
enable shareholders to thrive.  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
An assumption is a realistic expectation about something believed to be accurate 
(Gheondea-Eladi, 2014). In research, scholars can develop theories and hypotheses that 
originate from initial assumptions. Marshall and Rossman (2016) asserted that 
assumptions are statements considered true or taken for granted. I assumed that the 
interview participants provided knowledgeable and honest responses to the interview 
questions. I sought to meet this assumption by interviewing business leaders that I was 
certain had the appropriate experience and qualifications. The other assumption was that 
the emergent information derived during data analysis and interpretation was 
representative and encapsulated the main theme without any gross omission on crucial 
information. I designed and organized the data collection by using open-ended questions 
that provided the participants with the chance to openly discuss their responses. Fan 
(2013) stated that the correctness and reliability of a test are as much about the method of 




Limitations are the potential shortcomings of a study (Marshall & Rossman, 
2016). In case study research, limitations are the issues beyond a researcher’s control 
which have the potential to affect the trajectory of a study. Theoretical considerations are 
guides for data collection in part and explainers of any research limitations (Astroth & 
Chung, 2018; Connelly, 2013). The interview participants are from the insurance industry; 
as a result, participants were limited to only insurance companies with financial insurance 
services. The results were not generalizable to other specialized industrial sectors. The 
second limitation was the case study participants’ provision of information captions of 
their own perceptions of corporate governance for each case study. To mitigate the 
second limitation, I attempted to ask all the participants open-ended questions and 
provided a summary of transcriptions for their review to help in identification and 
elimination of their perception and biases. I also gathered data by interviewing and 
triangulating the data collection from the interviews with publications of company 
documents that are publicly available to all.   
Delimitations 
Delimitations are boundary lines and substances that were beyond the scope of 
this study (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The findings from this study are suitable and 
applicable for large corporations. I delimited my research study to large insurance 
industries with significant capital outlay. Consequently, it is incorrect to incorporate the 
results of this study in evaluating and enhancing the corporate governance structure of 
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private or small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the insurance industry or large 
entities within the financial and banking sector. 
Significance of the Study 
The findings from this study may have value to business leaders given the focus 
on the fundamental methods used by insurance companies to support corporate 
performance. Results from this study could also be of value to the practice of business as 
insurance business leaders may use this information to devise corporate governance 
strategies to increase profitability. These strategies are fundamental for the enhancement 
of organizational financial performance and could ensure that a broad array of procedures 
are present to guarantee sound governance, as an effective corporate governance structure 
can provide incentives to achieve the objectives and interests of an insurance company 
(Mugarura, 2016). 
Contribution to Business Practice  
The potential contributions to the effective practice of business include improved 
awareness by insurance companies of corporate governance strategies that have a direct 
bearing on the financial performance of companies. The findings may facilitate the 
effective practice of business by identifying strategies and processes for improving 
corporate governance. Chang, Yu, and Hung (2015) underscored the essential role of 
addressing business leaders’ governance strategies keen on value creation and 
demonstrated that companies with sound corporate governance reported higher financial 
performance than those companies that paid less attention to governance.  
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Implications for Social Change  
The implications for positive social change for local communities in Austria 
include the potential for better access to insurance for residents, stable employment 
opportunities for insurance company employees, and the investor restoration of trust in 
insurance investment portfolios. The restoration of trust by the local community implies a 
good business reputation for the industry, which creates new capital for companies’ 
investment in the society (Elahi, 2012). Increasing insurance companies’ profits can 
benefit policyholders and investors due to the cascading effect of increased profits 
(Waweru, 2014).   
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
This literature review is a comprehensive overview of the literature on the 
fundamental methods used by insurance companies to support corporate performance. 
The purpose of a literature review is to provide a context for a research study as well as 
indicate the place within the existing body of research where a proposed study fits (Yin, 
2014). Consequently, I provided a comprehensive analysis of literature from current 
knowledge based on the research topic of this study. 
The critical analysis of this literature review is indicative of my reliance on the 
conceptual framework and its grounding principal-agent theory. Agency theory is a 
dominant factor in considerations and discussions regarding corporate governance. 
Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011) asserted that the agency theory is essential for companies 
and at the fore of strategy by management when considering aspects of corporate 
governance. Notable scholars have formulated theories around governance (Abels & 
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Martelli, 2013; Zitouni, 2016). However, the majority of theories on corporate 
governance still hinge around the principal-agent theory. 
I organized this review of professional and academic literature in topical structure 
by addressing one focus area after another. Researchers and scholars routinely use the 
chronological or topical style when conducting and documenting the literature review 
segment of a research study (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013). While building on the 
conceptual framework, I ensured that this section contained a comprehensive discussion 
of the conceptual framework, an exhaustive review of the genesis and evolution of 
leading theories, as well as an analysis of the contrasting critical theories on corporate 
governance. I relied on the Walden University Library as the primary source for peer-
reviewed journals and articles published between 2013 and 2018. 
The Strategy for Searching the Literature 
The strategy for searching for literature is an essential component of the literature 
review that enables researchers to safeguard the appropriate usage of literature for 
research studies. Yin (2014) stated that scholars use the literature review to provide 
insight into the manner that they may limit the scope of an intended study to a specific 
area of inquiry. For this literature view, I used the following databases: ProQuest, 
Emerald Insight, Science Direct, and SAGE Journals. I also used the Google search 
engine and Google Scholar to obtain information about the code of corporate governance, 




I explored several keywords and phrases from my area of study and ensured first 
that I set the filter of my search to capture peer-reviewed scholarly materials published 
after the year 2013. The main key words and phrases that I explored include the code of 
corporate governance, the supervisory board, Board of Directors, risk management and 
the governance strategies. Consequently, of the 141 articles used in the literature reviews, 
93.67% or 132 were peer-reviewed. Ninety-two percent of the articles in the literature 
review were published between 2014 and 2018.  
Corporate Governance 
The term corporate governance has different definitions. Corporate governance is 
the established process and systems in place to ensure control and provide direction for 
companies (Zitouni, 2016). Researchers continue to seek an optimal balance for 
stakeholders by maximizing the interest of shareholders.   
The commencement of capitalism is considered as the original base of corporate 
governance. However, there is ambiguity within world economies when governments and 
other regulatory institutions begun to possess a systematic process and management of 
company governance (Zitouni, 2016). The principal-agent theory continues to remain at 
the center of corporate governance. Leadership knowledge of the role of the agency 
theory is the precursor to understanding the various intricacies and opposing viewpoints 
around corporate governance (Glinkowska & Kaczmarek, 2015; Kultys, 2016). Business 
leaders and scholars possess a keen awareness on the essential link that agency theory 
plays on the corporate governance stage; nonetheless, it is essential to moving beyond 
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that knowledge base to understand its applicability and dynamic potential when optimally 
applied. 
Several theories and models are present on the theme of corporate governance. 
Examples of theories include the agency theory, stewardship theory, and the stakeholder 
theory. The global financial scandals in the past decade (2000s) are evidence that the 
existing framework of corporate governance is not sufficient and instead underscore that 
the measures and strategies in place fall short and would not guarantee sound governance 
(Kultys, 2016). The global financial business leaders have formulated various 
propositions and notable theories around corporate governance (Abels & Martelli, 2013; 
Zitouni, 2016). Most of the theories on corporate governance essentially hinge around the 
agent-principal theory. 
Contentions prevail regarding whether the principal-agent theory is the genesis of 
poor governance and if leadership and training are the foundations by which sound 
governance thrives. Clarke (2015) argued that agency theory was one-dimensional and 
had a rigid simplicity as it mainly viewed the position and rights of the shareholder. 
Scholars such as Kultys (2016), and Ross and Mitnick (1975) opted to provide alternative 
theories. Kultys (2016) maintained that the limitations of the agency theory such as the 
assumptions of egoism flaw the agency theory. According to Kultys, business 
management reliance on the agency theory will not guarantee sound governance. 
A dominant theory. The agency theory remains a dominant factor in global 
corporate finance in the considerations and discussions on corporate governance. 
Business scholars often regard agency theory as a subtopic of corporate governance. 
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Agency theory is a broad term. Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011) asserted that the agency 
theory is essential for companies and at the forefront for global companies when 
considering aspects of corporate governance and underscored that it is the essential link 
joining the constituent parts of corporate governance. Agency theory is pivotal in the 
discussion by business leaders on corporate governance due to its magnification of the 
intricacies and complexities of the principal-agent theory. The intricacies include the role 
of management the BD, the compensation of CEO, and the interest of other stakeholders. 
The intent of the agency theory was the formulation of strategies that would ensure that 
directors act in the best interest of the company. The notion of influencing the action of 
directors through alignment of their compensation with shareholder interest led to the 
creation of stock options as part of remuneration packages for CEOs and senior 
managers.  
Seeking solutions. Scholars continue to propose that the best way to safeguard 
shareholder interest is by ensuring congruency between the interests of shareholders and 
executives. For instance, Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011) contributed to the field of 
corporate governance by magnifying the fundamental limitations of lopsidedness of the 
principal-agent theory which only considered the interest of the shareholder. Khan (2011) 
took the knowledge on corporate governance a step farther by suggesting the steps to 
remedy the flaws within the principal-agent theory by clearly distinguishing between the 
function of the shareholder and the executives.  It is clear that a leader’s use of a scheme 
that only maximizes shareholder interest produces numerous scandals, with some senior 
executives and stock market analysts colluding or engaging in other forms of malpractice 
15 
 
in the hope of maximizing short-term profits at the expense of a company’s long-term 
prospects and profitability. Misconduct can occur when executives doctor quarterly or 
short-term performance statistics on which their pay relies to award themselves a high 
income. Hence, the executives who incorporate the fundamentals of the principal-agent 
theory may not necessarily realize sound corporate governance for their companies.  
 Business leadership attempts at achieving sound corporate governance may seem 
elusive, although it is attainable and the main way to guarantee financial viability and 
success. Khan (2011) said that sound governance is realizable only by addressing the 
flaws that existed with the principal-agent theory, a view that aligns with that of Clarke 
(2015), Christensen (2016),   and Kultys (2016) as they also highlighted the necessity to 
address the flaws of the agency theory. Clarke noted that agency theory is reliant on the 
premise of shareholder primacy that suited the era immediately succeeding the Industrial 
Revolution; however, leadership on the notion of shareholder primacy as the sole 
objective as proposed by agency theory wrought continual damage to society and 
economies. The damage include the global financial scandal, no regard for the interest of 
other stakeholders and poor governance for businesses, Khan stressed the need for 
businesses to distinguish clearly between the role of the shareholder and the executives. 
Khan’s focus was on the distinct separation between the function of the shareholder and 
the executives, and not the sole desire to gain congruence between the two roles. .  
The law and legal enactments. Financial regulatory institutions recognize the 
importance of alignment in the role of the agent and principal and seek to take action to 
remedy any mismatch that exists. The mismatch between the two functions is the crux of 
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global corporate financial scandals. Various governments and the international financial 
community have instituted measures to segregate the principal-agent role within 
corporate bodies (Enriques & Zetzsche, 2015). For instance, the need to protect 
shareholders from misappropriation and poor governance through fraudulent accounting 
led the United States Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The European 
Union, The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 
World Bank have each formulated principles of good governance and CSR. Enriques and 
Zetzsche (2015) observed how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was ineffective in preventing 
further corporate scandals and restoring public trust and stated that hasty preparation and 
approval with little support from empirical financial literature renders it detrimental to 
corporate governance. Hence, although the codes of corporate governance are insightful, 
the legislative failings behind their enactment weaken their full effect.  
Corporate Governance and CEO Remuneration  
Controversies remain regarding CEO compensation and whether it should directly 
remain tied to performance. The CEO of Deutsche Bank, John Cryan said that he was 
unsure why his pay package included a bonus, yet he would work with the same zeal 
regardless of the day or year (Farrell, 2015). The maximization of shareholder interest 
occurs when the remuneration of the CEO aligns with firm performance in agency theory 
(Dedman, 2016). However, scholars such as Kultys (2016) and Clarke (2015) hold the 
belief that performance-tied remuneration, particularly those linked to short-term 
measures, is the leading cause of the numerous financial scandals that permeated the 
media in the 2000s.  
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Knowledge of the presence or absence of a significant relationship between CEO 
recompense and CSR disclosure is essential. Rashid (2018) stated that corporate 
governance practices do not have any influence on corporate social reporting of 
companies. Ali Reza and Amir (2018) said that the CEO and senior management 
establish the strategic direction and are responsible for securing the policies and strategies 
geared toward business success. A business strategy is the manner in which companies 
develop a detailed plan of its prerequisite for success (Umar, Sasongko, Aguzman, & 
Sugiharto, 2018). It is considered that a connection exists between corporate governance 
and social responsibility although few literatures have outlined whether a direct 
relationship between CEO compensation and CSR was present. Instead, there are 
findings that reveal the link that exists between the types of CEO compensation, whether 
through stock or non-stock option, and firm performance. Examples of findings with 
linkages between CEO compensation and performance include the study by Boumosleh 
and Cline (2015) where the authors found that director option remuneration had an 
inverse relation with the distribution of dividends.  
It is challenging to create a uniform scale for use to gauge CEO compensation 
across different industries, in spite of the existence of linkages between disclosure type 
and CEO compensation. As such, Gill (2014) stated that two separate compensation 
gauges should be set aside, one for the CEOs of profitable companies and the other for 
CEOs of loss-making companies. While corporate governance disclosures are simpler to 
construct than social disclosures, it is inaccurate to gauge or score any disclosure solely 
on a disclosure basis as other parameters need to also be considered For example, it is 
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essential to consider the reason for the creation of each company policy, which requires 
public disclosure by senior management. Kim, Park, and Wier (2012) said that firms that 
behave in a socially responsible manner were more likely to act responsibly toward 
earnings management which protects shareholder wealth. A socially responsible company 
is more likely to ascribe to the principles of corporate governance without the sole 
reliance on appropriate executive compensation to attain sound governance.  
Lack of clarity regarding CEO compensation. While there may be a 
relationship between CSR and CEO compensation, there is lack of clarity regarding the 
provision of a controlled environment that may negate other factors that could play a 
central role in enabling the relationship. Empirical study of Guthrie, Kwon, and 
Sokolowsky (2017) is denotative of a positive relationship between CEO compensation 
on one side and experience, qualification, and organizational type on the other. CEO 
compensation is a function of several factors that include corporate performance, CEO 
training, record of accomplishment, and the perception of the propensity of his or her 
ability to influence and deliver corporate returns. 
A discussion on corporate governance and CEO compensation is incomplete 
without consideration of the links between firm performance and the remuneration of 
CEOs. Laskar and Maji (2016) said stock options are one of the principal ways through 
which companies reward CEOs with bonuses for satisfactory performance. Laskar and 
Maji were explicitly interested in the effects of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation during moments of financial recession and explored the opposing 
viewpoint conventionally held that CEO pay directly relates to performance. Better-
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governed firms that provide marginally high returns to CEOs in the form of stock options 
have the predisposition during a recession to outperform those that exaggerate CEO 
compensation (Armstrong & Green, 2013; Laskar & Maji, 2016). Hence, the revelation 
about the linkages between firm performance and the remuneration of CEOs is valid as it 
is reliant on the essential element at the core of every shareholder interest, that is the 
CEO compensation, and the manner in which corporate entities attempt to align CEO and 
shareholder interest.  
Conventionally, corporate governance is heavily reliant on financial performance 
measures originating from audited financial statements that portray earning levels and 
other means of growth. However, Lau and Roopnarainb (2014) expanded on the 
importance of incorporating non-financial performance measures, which are measures, 
not expressed in monetary units due to the increasing interest in non-financial 
performance measures and supported the idea of the importance of organizational 
awareness on the organizational use of specific performance measures to enhance 
employee motivation. The dominant use by corporate organizations of financial 
performance measures obscures the use of non-financial measures to gauge financial 
performance. 
Remuneration with Long-Term Stock Options 
There is a clear link between corporate governance and executive performance as 
corporate governance plays an essential function in the monitoring and control of 
operations. Sound governance enhances firm performance (Choi, Jo, Kim, & Moo, 2018; 
Wanyama & Olweny, 2013). Zhang and Gimeno (2016) said long-term investors and 
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managers could work in tandem to reduce quarterly earnings and focus instead on long-
term profitability, sustained growth, and performance. Lau and Roopnarainb (2014) 
recommended that financial performance measures entail a financial and non-financial 
yardstick, though a focus by corporate organizations on long-term profitability introduces 
a new dimension scope, which fails to stipulate whether a measure of performance is 
financial or non-financial. Zhang and Gimeno (2016) focused on how various conditions 
of corporations affect the strategic direction of executives in the face of the quarterly 
earning obsession that permeates the stock markets. Zhang and Gimeno complemented 
the findings of Baber, Sok-Hyon, Lihong, and Zinan (2015) and highlighted the 
correlation that exists between long-range investor attitude and short-term earning by 
evidencing that indeed a negative relationship is present. Corporate directors rely on the 
findings by Baber et al. (2015) in establishing optimal compensation and fringe benefits 
for C-level staff or high ranking executives in a manner that reduces the propensity for 
misconduct and poor governance.  
Incentive contracting. Human resource managers rely on incentive contracting 
as a tool for performance management to motivate employees to realize a perceived 
objective. Geiler and Renneboog (2016) analyzed the executive remuneration by 
concentrating their efforts on the pay of the CEO by carrying out a quantitative research 
method using the statistical regression approach and the nested logit model and said that 
the suitability of corporate governance is reliant upon environmental as well as 
organizational imperatives. These findings add to the growing body of knowledge that 
links corporate governance and performance with environmental considerations.  
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The findings by Geiler and Renneboog (2016) indicated that for non-dividend 
protected pay, the option of pay had a direct bearing on a CEO's stock options. As most 
stock options are not dividend protected, scholars suggest that stock options motivate 
managers to opt for the repurchase of stock over a dividend payout (Boumosleh & Cline, 
2015). Geiler and Renneboog illustrated the existence of an inverse relationship where 
the projected stock prices had a compressing effect on the value of stock and other 
equity-related remuneration and advocated that senior managers and human resources 
managers should devise strategies that ensure that the compensation for senior managers 
was dividend blind or dividend neutral. The recommendation would ensure that the type 
and manner of equity payouts would never influence the CEO wealth.  
Long-term stock options. An intricate association is present between a business 
executive remuneration and performance. This linkage is present whenever human 
resource managers document and propose the contractual details for the pay package of 
CEO and senior managers. Liu, Padgett, and Varotto (2017) studied the linkage between 
bank merger and executive compensation and the manner in which it linked explicitly to 
corporate governance and analyzed pre-post-merger on essential components such as the 
ROA-Return on Assets, leverage, equity, and risk. Contrary to the position advocated by 
Boumosleh and Cline (2015), Geiler, and Renneboog (2016), their results support the 
view of absence in the linkage between bonus payment and measures of value creation. 
The finding by Liu et al. is essential in the provision of a contrary view than the girding 
premise of the agency theory where misalignments often imply that CEO compensation 
may not be commensurate with corporate performance. Consequently, Liu et al. observed 
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that while salary and other long-term compensation were consistent with optimal 
contracting arrangements, bonus payments had the potential for manipulation in 
corporate entities without sound governance. The knowledge of the flaws in using bonus 
as a motivational tool is essential evidence supporting the view that misalignment of the 
interest of shareholder and CEO would not necessarily fail in maximizing shareholder 
wealth.  
Understanding the contribution of scholars to the intricacies of the linkage 
between CEO remuneration with long or short-term stock options is necessary for 
performance contract management and more importantly for gaining an understanding on 
the effects of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, a corroboration of the limitation of 
each study is necessary when considering each contribution. For instance,  an essential 
limitation of the study by Liu et al. (2017)  is its primary focus on the banking sector and 
its restrictive in scope that center purely on the pre-and post-merger period.  
Agency Theory Framework and Governance 
Introduction. Agency theory is the relationship that prevails between the 
principal who is the shareholder, and the agent who is the company’s management. In the 
agency theory or the agent-principal relationship, the overriding assumption is that the 
managers are inclined to make decisions that would not maximize shareholder interest 
due to non-alignment of goals between the principal and the agent (Abdullah & 
Valentine, 2009). Agency theory is ignorant of the works of other theories such as the 
indispensable assumptions from traditional management theory. Davis et al. (1997) 
differed with the views postulated by the agency theory and asserted that agency theory 
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assumes that management would always opt for the best alternative that increases their 
self-interest when faced with different options. Similarly, Pande and Ansari (2014) 
aligned their stance with Davis et al. and observed that the present governance structure 
and the blurring of roles between the shareholder, the board, and management work to 
make agency theory unproductive at its best.   
Agency theory is denotative of the principal-agent theory. Ross and Mitnick 
established the agency theory in 1973 (Mitnick, 1973). Mitnick was responsible for the 
introduction of today’s conventional concept that institutions use around agency 
(Mitnick, 1975). On the other hand, Abels and Martelli (2013) contended that the 
economic theory was the origin of the agency theory and that it is near impossible to 
discuss corporate governance without reference to the principal-agent theory. Other 
scholars such as Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernandez-Izquierdo, and Munoz-Torres (2012) and 
Denis (2016) emphasized on other essential aspects in the understanding of corporate 
governance structures. Geiler and Renneboog (2016) analyzed the governance structure 
through the prism of CEO remuneration and noted that environmental and organizational 
imperatives were essential in devising a sound governance structure.  
Interest alignment for the principal-agent. The principal-agent theory is a 
derivation from the relationship termed as the principal-agent relationship. Given the 
nature of corporate entities there are two stakeholders at the heart of each corporate body 
in the principle-agent (Anand, 2012). The two stakeholders are the principal and the 
agent with the principal as the shareholder and the executives, the agent (L'Huillier, 
2014). The central proposition of this theory state that shareholders desire a maximization 
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of their interest in a company when they invest capital while the executive leads and 
manage the company with the shareholders hopeful that the actions of the executives 
would be in the best interest of the shareholders (Isaac, 2014). Understanding the 
necessity of alignment, and the manner of achieving that alignment of interests is 
paramount in corporate governance. Dawar (2014) identified the mismatch in interest 
between the shareholders and executives as the crux of misconduct. Agency theory is the 
leading and founding theory of corporate governance while agency cost is its derivative. 
Agency cost is the cost an agent incurs while acting on behalf of a principal (Abels & 
Martelli, 2013). These costs prevail due to problems, such as conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management (Feil, Rahman, & Sabac, 2018; Manzur Quader, & 
Dietrich, 2014). It is in the interest of companies to reduce these costs to every extent 
possible in the efforts to align stakeholder interest. 
Limitations. Although agency theory holds a central place in the formulation of 
corporate governance principles and is one of the fundamental theories that emanate from 
economics it is not without limitations. Building upon the agency theory's drawback on 
the hypothesis of misaligned interest prompted (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1993) to 
develop the stewardship theory that provided a new perception to understanding the 
relationships between shareholder and management. The authors proposed that while on 
their own, managers will act responsibly as stewards of the assets they control. The 
stewardship theory addresses the limitations and assumptions of the agency theory 
(Balakrishnan, Malhotra, & Falkenberg, 2017). Hence, the stewardship theory counters 
the central hypothesis of the agency theory as espoused by Ross and Mitnick (1975) and 
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supported by researchers, as such Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011). The view advocated by 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) in formulating the stewardship theory, and in detailing the 
shortcomings of agency theory matches with the views by Clarke (2015) and Kultys 
(2016) who were highly critical about the weaknesses of agency theory. As such, the 
premise in stewardship theory is contradictory to, and divergent with the premise in the 
agency theory. 
Alternative theories. Business scholars have candidly taken the option of making 
consideration of the two dominant theories around corporate governance. For instance, 
Glinkowska and Kaczmarek (2015) studied the two-tier board of a company where they 
analyzed both the classical and modern approaches to corporate governance through the 
lenses of agency theory and stewardship theory. The authors contended that the heart of 
the problem with poor governance lies squarely on the relationship between the 
supervisory board and the governance management board, and the role performed by the 
supervisory board. In their study, they drew parallels and comparisons between the 
agency and the stewardship theory where they underscored that theoretical basis for 
agency theory and stewardship theory is the field of economics and organizational 
psychology respectively (Glinkowska & Kaczmarek, 2015). The authors’ findings and 
conclusion are indicative that attempts at refining and creating a modified and 
complementary theory for agency theory signify the lack of an optimal model for 
corporate governance. This viewpoint differs with that of Mitnick (1975), Donaldson and 
Davis (1993) as well Clarke (2015), and Kultys (2016) who were keen contenders of a 
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sole holistic theory and not a theory that modified the considerations of agency and 
stewardship theory.  
The desire to mitigate the limitations of the agency theory that could not 
effectively curtail the numerous global scandals led to the propagation of the stewardship 
theory and the OECD guidelines. Clarke (2015) criticized agency theory as overly 
lopsided and one-dimensional. Donaldson and Davis (1993) also aligned their 
recommendations with Clarke by stating that agency theory relies on methodological 
individualism and possesses a shallow motivation model. These criticisms intersect with 
the opinions of Kultys (2016) who identified the spate of corporate governance and the 
unending economic crisis as the key drivers of the ongoing debate on corporate 
governance. In the study, Kultys used the descriptive and comparative method in the 
presentation of various models of corporate governance and presented a thorough 
analysis of the agency theory. Kultys created a model with supporting documentation on 
the definition of agency theory with egotism as the dominant limitation of the theory.  
Business and economics scholars continue to propagate alternative theories to 
mitigate the perceived shortcomings of the agency theory. Kultys (2016) provided 
extensive descriptions of other theories that include the stewardship theory and contrasted 
its differences with the agency theory. Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (2005) stated that 
assumptions that a contractual agreement between the principal and agent are 
unreasonable to resolve the agency problem and proposed the market for corporate 
control where a well-performing firm takes over an inefficient one and as a result 
eliminate poor performing manager. The research by Kultys intersects with that of Kini et 
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al. as both researchers deliberated on the social agency theory that is an extension of the 
classical agency theory, and stated that its creation was due to the unrealistic 
underpinnings of the agency theory.  
Business scholars have been able to highlight the shortcomings of agency theory 
in the proposals of alternative theories. Kultys (2016) contended that the agency theory is 
wanting, suggesting a modified version that incorporated a legal framework that gave 
preeminence to the director primacy model vide the theory of team production. Panda and 
Leepsa (2017) supported the inclusion of an independent board of directors to regulate 
the decision and actions of senior managers in aligning them with the interest of the 
shareholders. The research by Kultys is in alignment with that of Panda and Leepsa as 
Kultys recommended a revision of the corporate law that would confer power to the 
board of directors. A recommendation of the accordance of power to the board of 
directors is in stark contrast with the current agency theory where shareholders confer 
power to the board. 
CEO duality. Although CEO duality is rampant and legal, many perceive its 
governance structure as feeble. Abels and Martelli (2013) criticized the mechanism of 
CEO duality as an optimal governance structure after carrying out a study of large 
corporations in the United States listed on the Fortune 500. Abels and Martelli 
demonstrated and contrasted the extent of CEO duality that existed in 2008 to 2010, and 
showed the manner in which retiring CEO continued to act as company chairperson. 
Conversely, Firth, Wong, and Yang (2014) undertook a study in corporatized state-owned 
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firms in China and noted that in profit-making firms, CEO duality is detrimental to firms’ 
corporate governance and performance.  
The assumption in the corporate business world is that CEO duality represents a 
weak governance structure and hence invariably leads to an increase in agency costs. 
Abels and Martelli (2013) commenced their study on the premise that the agency theory 
implies that duality in the role of CEO and chairperson increases the chance of agency 
costs, as it predisposes management to self-interest. They contended that the duality 
permitted CEOs to dominate over the board of directors, which was the main reason that 
led the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulatory authorities to 
insist that companies divorce the dual CEO and chairperson role. Their findings, although 
skewed toward duality in CEO role, are in alignment with the view held in Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands, where the governmental regulatory authorities had long 
instituted a dual-tier system, albeit for the board of directors with the management as 
separate from the supervisory board. Bezemer, Peij, de Kruijs, and Maassen (2014) 
identified the manner of curtailing the inherent complexities of a two-tier board 
consisting of the supervisory and management board and suggested that the two-tiered 
board system as an effective tool for attaining sound corporate governance. The research 
recommendation by Bezemer et al. intersects with that of Abels and Martelli in 
advocating for a dual governance structure. Both studies have potential in offering 
support to the recommendation for segregating the dual role of CEO and chairperson 
within public corporations with the aim of enhancing sound governance through 
independence and transparency. 
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The Effect of Globalization on Firm Governance 
The global business world is complex, dynamic, with a plethora of mergers, 
acquisitions, and hostile takeovers, and other structures established to protect against 
torrential currents and cut-throat competition. Thanks to globalization, it is increasingly 
becoming difficult to speak of a standalone market as the world has become intensely 
interconnected. We live in a globalized world where the trading occurs in one 
marketplace. Enhancement in the transmittal speed of information, knowledge, goods, 
and services is the result of the information era in tandem with technological innovations. 
Ahmed and Van Hulten (2014) noted that globalization would likely only benefit 
countries that are open to trade and possess sound institutions. While there are several 
benefits from globalization, anti-globalization activists suggest the contrary, that 
globalization is solely responsible for a plethora of social and economic ills that permeate 
today's society. Globalization has created an integrated financial and capital market 
development, which creates uncertainty and risk (Aziz, Manab, & Othman, 2015). Hence, 
risk management continues to gain prominence in the global financial world. 
Financial scandals. There are several definitions for globalization though the 
topic of globalization and its related benefits remains deeply contentious. The years 
succeeding 1990 were times of massive expansion, growth, and economic development 
that saw companies move to establish businesses abroad. Yoder, Visich, and 
Rustambekov (2016) indicated that many companies adopted an international expansion 
strategy to take advantage of emerging opportunities presented by target markets. 
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However, Harris (2015) noted that distortions in the rampant growth and success 
of companies arose from the notable failures and financial scandals as companies sought 
profits. For example, Enron the energy giant became bankrupt in 2002 due to debt-related 
fraud and misrepresentation with Anderson following suit in the similar era. Equally, to 
eliminate corporate fraud, the USA enacted the Sarbanes Oxley's Act of 2002 while 
several nations enacted the codes of corporate governance for similar reasons. 
Notwithstanding, it is unfortunate that these regulatory measures are insufficient in the 
elimination of financial scandals from the global world. Globalization is impactful to 
firms in a myriad ways that produce unprecedented change and challenge to the 
robustness of each governance structures. Technological advances have translated to 
cheaper transportation costs and faster speed which imply that small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) can access global markets making the world closer and integrating 
trade, and global financial markets (Ahmed & Van Hulten, 2014). Globalization has led 
to the creation of new markets and the growth of new global players. Some countries in 
the southern hemisphere have witnessed sharp economic growth and development. Melo 
(2015) conducted a research study with a focus on the emerging markets and presented a 
comparative case study that viewed the various elements of corporate governance 
systems in the emerging economies of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). The 
author contrasted and compared the critical components of corporate governance for the 
countries clustered in similar groups and noted that there were stark differences observed 
in each group. 
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Governance structures are different from one jurisdiction to another, as does the 
role of the state, which may present a complicated scenario for international 
organizations whose regional operations transcend national borders. Duman and 
Üsenmez (2016) stated that rapid trade and globalization characterized the period post the 
1990s because of technological advancement, and showed how transformation on the role 
of the state aligned with the imperatives of a dynamic international market. On the other 
hand, Melo (2015) assessed the internationalization patterns of seven major companies 
within the BRICs with the composition of board structure and the requisite attributes of 
directors and noted that the role of the state should be minimal in guaranteeing an optimal 
system of governance. Duman and Üsenmez provided a contrary view detailing how the 
state plays a significant and transformative role of bailout to assist companies mired in a 
financial crisis.  
Monitoring and control are essential links in the realization of an optimal 
governance structure. In the research study by Duman and Üsenmez (2016) and Melo 
(2015) the government was the subject. However, Roman (2015) emphasized on the role 
played by the shareholder in combining a three-pronged approach to corporate 
governance by conducting a quantitative study on the banking and finance industry by 
analyzing the connection between corporate governance, internationalization, and 
government bailouts. Roman mainly addressed the element of monitoring by 
exemplifying how shareholder participation is essential and correlates with a company's 
risk and performance, and observed how shareholder involvement and activism might 
create shareholder value, and act as a destabilizing force. Roman aligned the conclusion 
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of his study around the shareholder-creditor conflict that often has the potential to lead 
high-risk return initiative that could be detrimental to creditors.   
Ethical Consideration of Globalization 
Business scholars often refer to business ethics as corporate ethics. Berger and 
Herstein (2014) defined business ethics as the moral philosophies that monitor the 
manner in which company acts. Business ethics is an essential component of 
globalization. Corporate leaders need to be prudent and trade ethically with globalization. 
Trading ethically ensures that leaders, shareholders, and other stakeholders hold the CEO 
accountable for ethically transacting business. Human rights activists have also assisted 
in the war against exploitation, as is the case when the human rights watch uncovered 
several instances of unethical practices. 
The creation of a universal global body is limited and may not guarantee that 
globally companies trade ethically and fairly. The production of a universal global body 
is undoubtedly impractical. Besides, it is impossible to institute an agency to oversee and 
guarantee that all companies will trade responsibly. Ahmed and Van Hulten (2014) said 
that globalization would likely only benefit countries that are open to trade and possess 
sound institutions. We live in a globalized world with fragmentation in the judicial or 
regulatory framework. Laws in one country are not necessarily applicable to another, 
besides it is inconceivable to imagine the laws to which such an oversight body would 
prosecute. 
Each person has a role to play in the global business arena that is increasingly 
dynamic and complex. The power and leverage for change rest mainly with consumers to 
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buy from companies that act ethically and responsibly (Fish & Wood, 2017). Consumers 
may choose to boycott individually or collectively the products that do not prescribe to 
the dictates of fair trade. Consumers can form movements or inform global activists about 
instances of unfair trade. Rodrigues and Borges (2015) stated that consumers play a 
central role in every section of the economic activity of a company. The perception of a 
company’s CSR potentially affects the attitudes of consumers toward a given. 
Accounting Qualification and Accounting Misrepresentation 
Many scholars try to establish a correlation between the recognizable accounting 
qualifications, or lack thereof, and accounting misrepresentation by firms in attempts to 
uncover the cause of scandals that permeated the corporate world. Adewuyi and 
Olowookere (2013) argued that corporations must hire aptly qualified managers and 
board members to guarantee sound governance and a corresponding reduction in 
noncompliance. The hire of skilled managers ensures that a compliance officer is in place 
for the proper implementation of the code of corporate governance. Adewuyi and 
Olowookere surmised the essential elements of organizational and performance 
management that managers and business leaders need to implement to assure sound 
governance continually. 
Singly, the lack of appropriate accounting qualifications does not directly 
construe an instance of accounting misrepresentation. In contrast to the research findings 
by Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013), Baber et al. (2015) segmented corporate 
governance into two parts and identified an external as well as an internal element toward 
misconduct and accounting misstatements. Baber et al. shed light on the apparent 
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linkages that exist between the misrepresentation of annual financial statements and 
corporate governance and identified the factors that provide an incentive for sound 
governance. These authors coined the term incentive effect to illustrate the relationship 
between the financial misstatement and external governance, by elaborating that 
management incentive to misrepresent financial statement and internal control oversight 
was a factor that directly determined the propensity of financial misrepresentation. Unlike 
the researchers Adewuyi and Olowookere who solely viewed internal factors as the 
leading cause of poor governance, Baber et al. contended that external governance plays 
a critical role. 
Board Appointment, Independence, and the Audit Committee 
A board of directors is independent when there is a substantial amount of 
independent non-executive directors. Bernard, Godard, and Zouaoui (2018) stressed on 
the qualification of the board of Directors. Various national stock exchanges recommend 
the appointment, the independence of a board of directors, and the presence of an audit 
committee as fundamental in guaranteeing a sound system of corporate governance 
(Mulgrew, Lynn, & Rice, 2014). Nonetheless, there are various empirical evidences 
regarding the effect of board structure on firm performance.  
 As with the independence, the qualification and experience of a board is an 
essential component in corporate governance literature. Padilla (2015) elaborated on the 
manner that disclosure of the knowledge of the board of directors affected the financial 
performance of companies. The author's literature review and theoretical framework 
addressed the main components of agency theory as well as the resource dependence 
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theory, and he undertook his research by conducting a quantitative study to assess 
whether there was a correlation between disclosures of director experience to firm 
performance. Padilla concluded that a relationship existed between the two variables; 
specifically, there were seven striking characteristics of the directors with linkages to 
good corporate performance.  
Qualifications of the Board of Directors. The qualifications of many board of 
directors are numerous and diverse as companies preferences differ. Some companies 
insist on specific attributes for the board of directors. There is an intersection in the 
research study by Padilla (2015) and White, Black, and Schweitzer (2015) as the 
researchers highlighted on the experience and qualification of the board of directors. 
White et al. undertook a study where they examined the effect of the appointment of an 
academic director on corporate governance. They specifically examined the processes 
and the procedure around the advertisement, selection, and hire of external directors. The 
authors indicated that most small- to medium-sized firms tend to employ foreign 
academic directors. Their study yielded comparative statistics that elicited the critical 
reasons behind the appointment of academic directors as well as the consequential 
reaction by the market on director heterogeneity. The empirical results and findings 
provide analysis and the clustering of firms to three broad groups for the types of 
academic directors and the related market reaction. 
Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2014) carried out a quantitative study and 
examined publicly traded companies in Spain. The authors noted the endorsement of 
Spanish best practices that the majority of members are independent directors and lead 
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the audit committee. In the study, Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster used a dataset 
consisting of 752 firms from 2009 to 2014. With this dataset, they compared the firms 
against a set of eight relevant statistics of board independence in Spain. Their results 
indicated that 14.2% of the firms had exactingly independent directors. Their analysis 
using the Pearson correlation coefficient revealed a high linkage between sales and 
market capitalization and confirmed that the stronger the control is by a significant 
shareholder, the lower the propensity for misrepresentation by independent directors. 
Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster viewed their findings in light of the agency theory, 
which premises that the independence of the director implies control and is an essential 
element to guard against the wealth confiscation of the shareholder. The authors 
supported the view that the independence of directors was more essential for firms with 
dispersed ownership structures than for those with concentrated ownership, such as those 
commonly found in Spain. The identification of the importance of director independence 
by Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, especially for firms with dispersed ownership 
structures indicate the point of digression with the research by Padilla (2015) and White 
et al. (2015) that focused on specific attributes of the directors. These digressions are 
evidence from empirical research about the influence of board structure on firm 
performance is varied. 
The appointment and independence of a board of directors is one prong in the 
understanding of the effect of the board of directors on corporate governance with an 
audit committee as the other. Mulcahy and Donnelly (2015) highlighted on the effects of 
the relationship between an external auditor and the audit committee members and 
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illustrated how the relationship influences the opinion of audit committee members when 
faced with divergent views between the external auditor and an organization's 
management. To accomplish this, the authors assessed and concluded that the audit 
tenure had no significant effect on the quality of work produced by an external auditor. 
Congruently, Brennan and Kirwan (2015), Krenn (2015), and Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) criticized the use of an audit committee and stated that it is one-sided, flawed with 
similar limitations as that of the Board of Directors, and failed to consider present day 
complexities. The use of an audit committee is inadequate in mitigating the shortcoming 
of reliance on the external scrutiny by the external auditor or board of directors. 
Mulcahy and Donnelly (2015) underpinned the role of an external audit toward 
the audit committee whereas Hsu and Wu (2014) undertook a quantitative investigation 
to uncover the relationship between board composition and organizational corporate 
failures in the United Kingdom. Their sample constituted a broad spectrum of failed firms 
that were deregistration from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1997 to 2010. 
Equally like Mulcahy and Donnelly, and, Hsu and Wu conducted a quantitative study 
using regression as well as a univariate analysis to assess the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate failure and used the definition provided by the U.K. 
corporate governance code to distinguish between the independent and non-independent 
directors. A grey director is often the terminology that is in use for non-independent 
directors. 
The findings by Hsu and Wu (2014) illustrated through the provision of annual 
comparisons of financial performance that companies with a higher percentage of grey 
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directors were less likely to fail. On the contrary, the researchers indicated the existence 
of a significant and positive relationship between independent directors and poor 
governance. The findings of the study are contrary to conventional thinking on corporate 
governance. For instance, Srivastava (2015) stated that a board composition with an 
independent, grey, and inside directors, is essential for sound governance. The findings 
are supportive of the propositions of the collaborative board model that underpins the 
essential role of the grey directors.  
The study by Srivastava (2015), Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2014), and 
Mulcahy and Donnelly (2015) have notable intersections and complementary points on 
the constituents parts of the Board of director function as an essential link in the quest for 
sound governance. Hsu and Wu (2014) gave value and credibility to the role played by 
grey directors and in contrary magnified the exaggeration placed on the role of 
independent directors after the onslaught of the major corporate scandals. The document 
by Hsu and Wu has fundamental leads and implications on past literature on corporate 
governance.  
Corporate Governance Regulation and Global Scandals 
The role of senior executives and accountants is essential in curtailing poor 
governance. Their actions, activities, and decision have an essential bearing on 
governance and the manner of sustenance of a company's profits over extended periods. 
Low, Davey and, Hooper (2008) observed that at the heart of most business scandals 
were accountants who knew, aided, or contributed to a corporate scandal. 
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The recent spate of financial scandals transcends through all regions, as the globe 
increasingly becomes a single trading floor. Sebhatu and Pei-lin (2015) focused their 
attention on newly industrialized nations with the example of China by conducting a 
multiple qualitative case study and highlighted that global scandals have been on the rise 
where they cited examples of the recent global scandals that occurred within the 
international concerns in China. In the article were reflections of the unfortunate reality 
and confounding fact of seeming contractions in the corporate world, where efforts 
marked toward global transparency do not align with a decrease in the level of global 
scandals. The authors observed that the United Nations Compact indicates that corruption 
accounts for about 10% of the total cost of doing business world over. The findings of the 
study are significant in the demonstration of the existence of a positive relationship 
between good governance and efforts to eradicate corruption. Sebhatu and Pei-lin 
elaborated on the linkages between governance and bribery and placed in context, the 
role of value-based businesses in working in tandem with governance framework 
established by governmental institutions. Corporate governance and misconduct possess 
linkages with changes in one factor influencing the other.  
Evidence from research of a correlation between governance, regulation, and 
global scandals particularly with globalization give possible indication to the existence of 
an inverse relation between the establishment of national governance regulation and 
global scandals. Mugarura (2016) sought to determine the existence of a linkage between 
the establishments of robust corporate governance regulations that is responsible for the 
success or failure of corporations. Mugarura stated that regardless of how robust internal 
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control rules are, the fate of firms is also dependent on factors such as globalization, 
which are beyond the control of firms. The intersection point in the research by Sebhatu 
and Pei-lin (2015) and Mugarura is in discounting the premise that the presence of 
national or corporate governance regulation automatically translate to the achievement of 
sound governance for firms. 
Financial Performance Linkage with Corporate Governance 
There are strong linkages between firm performance and corporate governance. 
Undoubtedly the topic of corporate governance has received many a great attention 
particularly after the continued spate of corporate scandals (Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, 
& Xu, 2011; Lins, 2009). Donker and Zahir (2008) contended that creation of a 
mechanism for corporate governance would indisputably eliminate void in corporate 
governance. Consequently, attempts to fill the void led to the formulation and suggestion 
of several tools that range from the gadgets that enhance more transparency to the 
proposal by international institutions of corporate governance for a unified regulatory 
framework. An example of a unified framework is the principles of corporate 
governance, formulated by the OECD. 
Corporate performance and risk. The intermediary role of governance in the 
linkage between corporate performance and risk is strong. For instance, Chang et al. 
(2015) undertook a study on Taiwanese listed companies to assess the link between firm 
performance and risk by relying on empirical evidence from Taiwan to develop a set of 
corporate governance assessment indices from the OECD categories. To proceed, Chang 
et al. fashioned a mechanism of unique features based upon firm disclosure, shareholder 
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rights, and the composition of the Board of directors. The authors were able to niche out 
the parameters that buckle corporate governance to risk and firm performance. The 
results of the studies on correlations between firm performance and corporate governance 
are confirmatory of the presence of a positive association with some notable exceptions. 
Chang et al. revealed five primary corporate governance variables associated with 
performance and risk, as well as highlighted on the mediating effect of corporate 
governance in the link between performance and risk. Correctly, the authors observed a 
divergence from the positive relationship between risk and return during a financial 
crisis, as the effect of corporate governance created a suppression effect, consequently, 
creating a negative correlation between risk and performance. Four distinct categorization 
of corporate governance variables were in the study results, where Chang et al. indicated 
that shareholder rights had a positive effect on firm performance and risk, as did the 
chairperson and CEO split. The research finding by Chang et al. are parallel with the 
research that Firth et al. (2014) undertook in corporatized state-owned firms in China and 
said that CEO duality is detrimental to firms' corporate governance and performance. 
The results of the study by Chang et al. (2015) that shareholder rights and the 
absence of CEO duality have a positive effect on firm performance and risk, and are 
parallel with the findings of the study by Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2012). Tsai and Tung 
(2014) noted that there is a relationship between CEO duality and government 
shareholding, and firm performance. The alignment fortifies the view that the 
effectiveness of the board of directors is sensitive to economic periods and the capital 
base serves to lower the rate of corporate risk-taking during a time of financial crisis. 
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Similarly, the research by Chang et al. in addition to creating an exception to the rule on 
the correlation between firm performance and risk showed that companies with higher 
levels of corporate governance reported high performance and low-risk levels. 
Consequently, Chang et al. underscored the essential role of addressing governance 
strategies by business leaders keen on risk management and value creation. These studies 
are essential in illustrating the essential link that exists between sound governance, firm 
performance, and risk, and for providing with the instances of the exception to the rule. 
The effect of regional and national dimensions. While the formulation of a 
specific set of assessment indices for governance is an essential component in assessing 
firm performance, there is a continuation in desire to delve farther in the understanding of 
corporate governance and risk through the attempt at uncovering the effect of regional 
and national dimensions. Waweru (2014) undertook a quantitative regression analysis 
and examined the most significant 50 companies in South Africa listed on the stock 
exchange. Waweru undertook the study to establish the main factors that drive the quality 
of corporate governance in South Africa. Similarly, Şahin (2015) undertook a research 
study to understand the legitimacy of the codes of corporate governance from the 
perspectives of the developed and emerging economies. 
Waweru (2014) described the main factors that shaped the standard of corporate 
governance as investment opportunity, firm size, and leverage, and observed that there is 
a plethora of studies focusing on the developed world with a limited number on sub-
Saharan Africa. Şahin (2015) noted that the adoption of the common features of corporate 
governance standards is due to globalization though the codes of corporate governance 
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are not operational. Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, and Stapleton (2012) echoed the 
findings and observations of Waweru and stated that study on regional dimensions adds 
values to understanding the geographical and regional dynamics of corporate governance 
as relatively fewer studies exist on governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Notwithstanding, 
developing economies each possess huge disparities amongst themselves (Euromoney, 
2007) hence the need to address corporate governance for each country separately. 
Consequently, it would be inappropriate to make blind generalizations of findings from a 
company to another with unique regional features.   
Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Evidence from the 
European context on the linkages between corporate governance and firm performance 
are numerous. Felício, Ivashkovskaya, Rodrigues, and Stepanova (2014) embarked on a 
study to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance by 
reviewing the significant banks listed on the European stock exchange. Their assessment 
led to the findings that specific corporate governance variables had a direct effect on firm 
performance. The variables include the appointment age and meeting frequency of the 
board of directors. The authors' study has a direct contribution, in the development of 
substantial performance drivers amongst corporate governance indicators within the 
European banks and synchronizes with the research by Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2012) and 
Waweru (2014). These authors noted that a correlation exists between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the financial performance of firms. The research study by 
Felício et al. provided unique lenses of a highly volatile capital market through which the 
effect of corporate governance on firm performance are observable.   
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The considerations of factors external to a firm are equally essential to the 
understanding of the linkage between governance mechanism and firm performance. 
Cheng, Liu, McConnell, and Rosenblum (2017) carried out a quantitative research study 
to ascertain causality by focusing their attention primarily on the fortune ranking of 
America's most outstanding company to establish the effect that this rating when 
published in the media, would have on corporate governance. The authors indicated that 
the ranking has a direct relationship and influence on CEO decisions on investment in 
firm capital. To underscore the linkage between governance and firm performance the 
report uses reputational risk.  
Reputational risk is not the sole external element in comprehending the linkage 
between governance mechanism and firm performance. The empirical results from the 
research study by Cheng et al. (2017) are parallel with the view of Dyck, Volchkova, and 
Zingales (2008) that exogenous favorable results may serve the purpose of heightening 
CEO reputational capital. Cheng et al. elaborated on the manner in which factors external 
to a firm may have a bearing and direct influence on CEO activity and influence on 
corporate governance. The findings on external factors that influence CEO activity are 
significant and potentially valuable to the body of knowledge in governance.   
Empirical research indicates the existence of a correlation between financial 
performance and governance mechanism. Habbash (2016) undertook a quantitative 
correlational research study to examine whether a positive relationship existed between 
corporate governance and financial performance by reviewing the market value and 
earnings on assets as well as the ROI-the return on investment of companies in the 
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2010 to 2014. The findings provide evidence to the presence 
of a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance. The findings of the study are in alignment with the recommendations of 
Felício et al. (2014) who noted that there is a correlation between governance structures 
and firm performance such. The findings by Habbash give credence to initiatives by 
regulatory authorities to encourage the full enactments of mechanism that enhance sound 
corporate governance. 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The manner of orientation of a firm’s corporate strategy has a direct bearing on its 
relationship with its stakeholders and its perceived societal responsibility. Consequently, 
the means and strategic aim of CSR and corporate governance are in close alignment. 
Devinney, Schwalbach, and Williams (2013) stated that a firm's CSR solidly anchors in 
its value proposition statement. A consideration of one without the full comprehension of 
the effect of the other is inadequate. O’Dwyer (2003) defined CSR as the means by which 
companies create and distribute wealth to all stakeholders with a high consideration for 
ethical implications. 
Firm ownership has a direct bearing on governance and the strategy on CSR. 
Choi, Lee, and Park (2013) undertook an assessment study by formulating five 
hypotheses, which resulted in findings of a negative correlation between CSR and the 
categories of earnings management. The result of the study by Choi et al., however, 
discounted their hypothesis by indicating that while a negative correlation existed, it was 
weak for firms that have a highly focused leadership structure. 
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Empirical evidence is demonstrative of the strong linkages that permeate 
corporate governance strategies on financial disclosure and transparency, particularly the 
manner in which they interweave with earning potential and ultimately corporate 
responsibility. Choi et al. (2013) provided insight on the linkages between CSR, earning 
and financial disclosure. The authors noted that there was a propensity for some firms to 
abuse CSR measures to cover up poor performance accordingly the authors discouraged 
the utilization of extreme CSR measures where firm ownership is highly skews toward 
institutional investors. 
Business literature on corporate performance incorporates the main considerations 
of the effect of corporate governance mechanism on firm performance during periods of 
financial crisis. Essen, Engelen, and Carney (2013) researched firms within the European 
Union prior and post a financial crisis to gauge the effect of sound corporate governance 
on corporate performance. Their findings are demonstrative that the establishment of 
proper measures of governance by firms was inadequate in a financial crisis. In essence, 
in a crisis moment, good governance policies would be counterproductive, as they would 
limit the highly desired broad decision-making platform necessary during crisis 
management. The study has significance in countering the conventionally held viewpoint 
that good governance had a direct effect on corporate performance consequently 
contradicting the research by scholars such as Felício et al. (2014). Notwithstanding, the 
research finding by Choi et al. (2013) is in alignment with the study by Ferrero-Ferrero et 
al. (2012) in the reinforcement of the view that the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms is sensitive to economic periods. Hence, with these studies their authors 
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outlined an illustration of the scope where good governance is unsuitable and 
demarcations of the boundaries and the value of good governance.    
Although wealth maximization is the overriding aim for firms, a corporate 
strategy that aims at establishing socially responsible firms have a direct bearing on the 
sound governance. Denis (2016) researched corporate governance and provided contrary 
evidence on the established business process of wealth maximization. Denis argued that 
the traditional norms that corporate entities use to maximize shareholder wealth were 
detrimental to businesses and other stakeholders. The author advocated for an all-
encompassing analysis and strategy that would adequately maximize and create wealth 
for shareholders, by generating higher net earnings as a result, high EVA-Economic 
Value added while minimizing the opportunity cost of doing business. Denis elaborated 
extensively on the potential detriments of deviating from shareholder wealth 
maximization. The study by Denis is indicative of how governance directly correlates to 
media pronouncement and engagement and how the efforts of government enhance good 
corporate governance. The research findings by Denis are in alignment with the 
investigation by Cheng et al. (2017) as both authors offered a revelation of the effect of 
public publication of company ratings on corporate governance. Denis demonstrated the 
essential linkages between corporate governance and CSR by emphasizing that sound 
corporate closely enshrines to wealth maximization for the shareholder and other 
stakeholders. 
Boosting CSR. Employees are an essential stakeholder group that is 
indispensable for any firm as employees have a significant role to play in the attainment 
48 
 
of a sound system of governance. Flammer and Luo (2017) undertook a research study on 
the employment of CSR as a tool to enhance employee engagement and found a positive 
correlation in companies' reaction to adverse employee behavior by heightened CSR 
endeavors. The benefits of using an effective CSR as a motivational tool is evident in the 
study. The authors provided substantial evidence of a relational link between CSR and 
employee engagement  
Business scholars strive to find a solid understanding of the effect that CSR and 
governance tangibly has on the profit margin of corporates. Fish and Wood (2017) 
underscored the importance of maintaining congruence between corporate governance 
and CSR. The author commenced by demonstrating how it was valuable for management 
to recognize and instill sound measures for corporate governance and CSR. Like Kultys 
(2016), Fish and Wood expanded upon agency theory and economic theory by 
underpinning on the insufficiencies of these theories. Fish and Wood illustrated the 
complete effect of CSR on corporate performance and hence added value to the body of 
knowledge on governance. The authors underscored the importance of maintaining an 
optimal balance between CSR and corporate governance as a key in providing assurance 
and positive perception to creditors and investors, which in turn translates to high firm 
value and credit rating. 
Corporate Governance and Stewardship Theory 
Business scholars refer to agency theory as the classical theory and stewardship 
theory the modern. These two theories are pivotal to understanding the central tenets as 
well as assumptions on which corporate governance is founded (Glinkowska & 
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Kaczmarek, 2015). The hypotheses of the stewardship theory are contrary to those of the 
agency theory. Several scholars contend that agency theory is limited in its effectiveness 
at enhancing sound governance, due to its flawed assumption that business leaders will 
always exhibit self-serving behavior while managing a company (Abels & Martelli, 2013; 
O'Connell, 2007). Hernandez (2012) stated that stewardship theory originated from the 
notion that business leaders guard the interest of shareholders and display self-sacrificing 
behavior. The stewardship theory further lends support to the view that managers would 
create profitable entities that enable shareholders to thrive. 
Although agency theory is essential in illustrating the conflict of self-interest, it 
suffers several drawbacks. Farias and Jones (2015) undertook a study to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the classical and modern theories in maximizing shareholder wealth by 
commenting that agency theory as the girding theory of executive remuneration is faulty 
and created a ground for mistrust and manipulation. As with Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
Farias and Jones (2015) noted that, the underlying assumptions of agency theory were 
deficient with incorrect assumptions that humans would innately ever opt for self-serving 
behavior. The authors contended that stewardship theory, which originates from 
psychology and other behavioral sciences, offered an alternative explanation for 
motivation and behavior.  
Limitations of agency theory. Several scholars provide empirical evidence that 
highlight the drawback of agency theory. The research study by Das and Dey (2016) 
noted a contrary viewpoint than that of the agency theory on aligning shareholder and 
management interest to safeguard wealth maximization, with measures such as executive 
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remuneration. Precisely, Das and Dey stated that there was no evidence that CEO 
remuneration and duality have a direct influence on firm performance as a result the 
research study intersects well with the investigation by Farias and Jones (2015). 
Agency theory is continually criticism for its unique dimensional outlook. Farias 
and Jones (2015) stressed that in the classical model for CEO pay the financial outcomes 
was prone to manipulation, while the stewardship theory was pro-organizational. 
Stewardship theory is supportive of aligning the CEO remuneration with transformational 
leadership and a closely associated remuneration system that intertwine with 
transformation and sustainability principles. 
The alternative theory. Stewardship theory is an alternative model to the 
classical agency theory through its heightened emphasis on transformational leadership 
and dynamic teams. Charas (2015) explored the dynamics of teams within the board of 
directors as a means to enhance corporate performance and illustrated that corporate 
performance improves when the board functions as a team. Charas supported the premise 
of stewardship theory and illustrated how directors failed to act in a self-serving manner, 
but instead, fostered team dynamics and value-creating activities, which positively 
influenced profitability. The research aligned with that of Farias and Jones (2015) that 
was supportive of stewardship theory and illustrating a CEO leadership that is purpose 
driven, responsible, and with attributes that align CEO and shareholder interest. Hence, 
these researches are illustrative that business leaders would inherently enhance team 
dynamics and optimize value-creating activities. The evidence from empirical literature 
illustrates that the action of shareholders influence business executives.  
51 
 
Business leaders have provided evidence on the manner in which the action of 
shareholders influence business executive. Hiebl (2015) stated that longevity of 
appointments of CFO and executives enhanced stewardship behaviors that were similar 
to the notions in stewardship theory.  
CFOs face agency conflicts in their dual role as stewards of company finances, 
and benefactors of incentive compensation that derive from books of accounts under their 
purview. Hiebl were keen to establish other theories to substitute the agency theory with 
the intention of providing a robust and an all-encompassing theory to curtail the 
onslaught of the global financial scandals. Habbash (2016) contributed to the field of 
corporate governance with the formulation of a new theory, the institutional theory by 
using parameters that included board size and executive compensation packages. The 
study by Hiebl has a distinct contribution to the girding theories of corporate governance, 
as it was the first to analyze both the stewardship and the agency attitude of the CFO.   
The attitude of the principal toward the agent is essential in understanding the 
shortcomings of agency theory, as is an understanding of corporate governance measures. 
Hiebl (2015) provided a body of knowledge that emphasized on the attitude of the 
principal and detailed how it was a strong determinant in the agents’ perception of 
management and control. On the other hand, Fish and Wood (2017) used the corporate 
governance index created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to gauge the extent of 
corporate governance in business entities. In spite of the potential contribution to the 
study on governance, by Habbash (2016), Fish, and Wood stated that the key reliance on 
secondary than primary data was a notable limitation in their study. Non-uniformity in 
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accounting practices continues to be a limiting factor in the comparability of information 
across business entities. 
Codes of Corporate Governance  
The code of corporate governance are the laws, frameworks, regulations, policies 
that determine how a company is directed (ElKelish, 2018; Schuchter & Levi, 2016). The 
high incidence of corporate scandals that have permeated the global business arena within 
the current and past decade has in part orchestrated the growing significance of corporate 
governance. Ongore and K’Obonyo (2011) stated that there is increased focus on 
corporate governance structures to assess their effect on accountability, transparency, and 
responsibility. For example, the UK code of corporate governance in 2016 is an 
amendment to enhance the guidance in the composition of the Audit Committee and the 
international standards of Auditing (Kultys, 2016). Consequently, the various regulatory 
authorities and arms of national institutes for enforcing sound governance establish or 
amend the codes of corporate governance to curb corporate misconduct and boost sound 
governance. 
Geographical dimensions of governance. Several countries make concerted 
efforts at promoting a high quality of corporate governance and reporting by enacting 
codes of governance to foster investment. Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016) conducted a 
study whose focus was the adoption of the new codes of governance in Russia in 2014 to 
examine the quality of corporate governance that enhance transparency and boost 
investor confidence. Prokhorova and Zakharova illustrated by using the country context 
of Russia the essential role of corporate governance and noted that it is an essential 
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determinant for institutional investors' in their choice to invest in Russia, and established 
the direct link between the inception of corporate governance in a country and an increase 
in national economic performance. Similarly, Yeoh (2016) undertook a study to assess 
the corporate governance failure that resulted in the financial crisis of major banks in the 
United States of America - USA and the United Kingdom-UK, by utilizing case study to 
assess the significant scandals and to determine the extent of investigation of all 
employees responsible for wrongdoing. Both research studies intersect at the point of 
determination that the codes of corporate governance are inadequate as the sole 
instrument for achieving sound governance.  
The inadequacy of the codes of corporate governance is a main topic in business 
literature on corporate governance. Nakpodia, Adegbite, Amaeshi, and Owolabi, 2018 
stated that neither the codes nor the rule of governance alone is effective for sound 
governance. Yeoh (2016) highlighted the perceived shortcomings of the corporate 
governance practices by key business leaders by outlining the limitations and persistent 
deficiencies of regulatory authorities such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) and the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Stanciu and Bran (2018) described the codes of corporate governance 
as the explain-or-comply principle which offers essential information as to the 
genuineness of board members’ commitment. Yeoh underscored that the corporate 
governance framework and structures had made it difficult for the laws and regulations to 
detect the symptoms of an impending financial scandal. Similarly, Prokhorova and 
Zakharova (2016) detailed that corporate governance codes serve as an investment 
incentive and its enactment and implementation leads to increased responsibility for 
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shareholders in strategic management and decision making. However, an absence of a 
directly variable relationship between the implementation of the codes of corporate 
governance and national economic performance imply that there is an exception to the 
rule. Hence, the findings are significant in magnifying the financial situation in Russia 
where commercial performance fails to maintain a sturdy pace with the efforts on the 
enforcement of the codes of corporate governance. The research studies are congruent 
and supportive of the premise that the codes alone would not achieve sound corporate 
governance as there are unique components within the codes of governance that lure 
investors to invest capital or discourage employees from engaging in financial 
misconduct. 
Empirical research provides evidence of linkages between the establishment of 
the codes of corporate governance and firm performance. Owusu (2016) undertook a 
study to examine the effect that compliance with the Ghanaian codes of corporate 
governance of 2003 had on governance quality and performance. The author used the 
Return on Asset (ROA) as the measure for firm performance to demonstrate the 
importance of the codes of corporate governance in enhancing good governance. The 
separation of the role of the CEO and chairperson of a board and an assurance that a third 
of the board of director is composed of independent directors enhances governance. 
Hence, the findings of the study are evident that a positive relationship exists between 
compliance with the codes of corporate governance and firm performance. Buallay, 
Hamdan, and Zureigat (2017) stated that corporate governance and firm performance are 
integral and closely aligned with risk management. Hence, the study by Owusu is in 
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alignment with the research by Yeoh (2016), Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016) but 
divergent on the determination of the end of the correlation between compliance with the 
codes of corporate governance and firm performance. Elshandidy, Shrives, Bamber, and 
Abraham (2018) stated that the principles and the mandatory corporate compliance 
measures possess the potential to complement each other. It is evident that the codes of 
corporate governance are essential but not reliable in assuring a robust system of sound 
governance. 
Corporate Governance within the Insurance Industry  
The insurance industry is an essential player in the global financial sector. 
Insurance premium for life and health, and the property, and casualty industry reported 
$7.3 trillion portfolio assets, which represent about half of the total portfolio assets of the 
insurance industry (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2013, p. 5). Evidence of an 
interconnection between the insurance industry and the financial system is apparent in the 
majority of the past global financial crisis. The presumption is that the non-financial 
sector, such as the insurance industry, has a more lenient framework for corporate 
governance than the banking industry (Woo, Rhee, & Woo, 2015). Through the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) was establishment in 2012 to provide 
oversight and enhance financial stability in the insurance industry.  
CEO duality. The general perception is that CEO duality has a positive influence 
on the quality of corporate earnings. Miller and Yang (2015) conducted a quantitative 
research study on corporate governance with a focus on the insurance industry by 
investigating the economic factors that determined the structural change for either a 
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combination or split in CEO role. In highlighting the unique position of the insurance 
industry, Miller and Yang (2015) indicated the firm size as the exclusive determinant in 
assessing the costs and benefit of splitting the CEO and board chair role with large 
insurance firm supporting a CEO duality leadership structure. Miller and Yang 
contributed a new dimension to the debates on the segregation of the function of the CEO 
and chair to the board. In spite the insistence by regulators on a split in CEO duality, the 
authors provided evidence from the publicly listed companies that supported a contrary 
viewpoint that support CEO duality. Hence, the study is contrary to the finding by Abels 
and Martelli (2013) and Chang et al. (2015) and scholars who do not support CEO 
duality. The finding by Miller and Yang are unique in the discussion of CEO duality in 
its provision of evidence that companies with a high percentage of independent directors 
were more pre-disposed to exploiting the advantages of CEO duality.  
Many member states within the European Union possess a two-tier company 
board structure with the supervisory and executive board. Rabóczki (2018) highlighted on 
the function of the supervisory as essential in providing oversight to the decisions of the 
management board. Bester (2015) undertook an exploratory case study to assess the rate 
of acceptance by the insurance companies in Slovenia to the newly established second-
tier corporate governance structure whose purpose was enhancing enterprise risk 
management. Regulators within the European insurance industry developed a 
mechanism, solvency II in 2016, to create an effective supervisory system and aid in 
anticipating and curtailing financial crisis prior to their occurrence (Cardone-Riportella & 
García-Mandaloniz, 2017). Solvency II, is made up of three primary pillars and uses a 
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risk-based methodology (E-Vahdati, Zulkifli, & Zakaria, 2018). Still, empirical research 
provides evidence that no single governance structure is sturdy enough to offer sound 
corporate governance. The study by Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016) and Yeoh (2016) 
are supportive of this view, and their findings are congruent with the research findings by 
Bester, who emphasized that no single standalone system would guarantee an efficient 
risk management system within the insurance industry. Bester instead stated that 
enterprise risk management, is itself, a blend of numerous, skills, principles and theories, 
which included items such as general management, planning, and risk modeling. 
Notwithstanding, the two pillar system continue to provide insurance companies with a 
well-integrated risk management platform. 
An initial pillar with quantitative indices for guidelines and a second pillar with 
qualitative constitutes a two-pillar system. Bester (2015) provided an essential knowledge 
and insights on the notable advantages and disadvantages of executing the second pillar 
to enhance corporate governance. Specifically, Bester stated that insurance companies 
perceived the second pillar as laborious, cumbersome, and ambiguous, even though its 
stipulations and guidelines, unlike pillar I, were qualitative hence less desirous of 
numerical tabulation. On the other hand, Mayes (2015) undertook a study on the 
regulations of the non-bank financial sector that were embroiled in major financial 
scandals in New Zealand during the period 2006 to 2010. The purpose of the study by 
Mayer was to determine whether the operational corporate governance stipulations and 
its guidelines were wanting. 
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The segregation of banks and non-financial institutions. The main contributing 
factor to the financial crisis within the insurance industry was the categorization of the 
banking and the non-financial institution, where the former, operated with a highly 
regulated and supervised environment than the latter. The insurance industry falls within 
the non-financial institutional category. Mayes (2015) provided extensive information 
and finite details on the treatment accorded to banking and non-financial and showed 
how providing institutions with the decision of an option of institution type of financial or 
non-financial, led to a weakening in the corporate governance structures. The weakening 
in governance structure was due to company preference for classification as some 
company executives preferred to opt for the non-financial designation for its presumed 
lenient governance stipulations.  
A system of sound corporate governance requires that a comprehensive and 
elaborate system is in place to assure governance whether in the banking or non-financial 
institution. Such a system is often the product of a skillfully woven strategy that 
encompasses all the essential component of a company operation for both the banking 
and non-financial institutions. Adams and Mehran (2012) observed that the focus on 
board effectiveness and governance of financial institutions with the omission of the non-
financial sector had led less scrutiny and weak governance in the financial industry. The 
presence of a robust governance system for the banking and non-financial sector is 
fundamental. Empirical research is in alignment with the perspective that accords a 
uniform governance principle to banking and non-financial as is evident from the survey 
by Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016), Yeoh (2016), and Bester (2015). This perspective 
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is congruent with the study of Mayes (2015) who created new knowledge that illustrated 
management failure and poor governance prior to a major global financial crisis. Mayes 
demonstrated to regulators of the banking and non-financial institutions that sound 
governance is the byproduct of widespread public disclosure and sound management, and 
not necessarily of the meddling supervision by the supervisory board.   
Corporate Governance: One or Several Theories?  
The agency theory is the dominant theory that girds the founding principles of 
corporate governance (Tomsic, 2013). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
several scholars have voiced the urgent need to develop a new corporate governance 
theory based on a holistic approach (Othman & Melville, 2016). Lattemann (2014) noted 
that corporate governance reforms in emerging countries shifted from a closed to a more 
open and transparent system. As such, several theories have been proposed and 
established to supplement or out rightly replace the agency theory. 
The propagation of several theories in attempts to create a best-fit framework 
theory of corporate governance continues. Borlea and Achim (2013) viewed corporate 
governance through time to chart the different theories formulated to enhance corporate 
governance. Although corporate governance is deeply rooted in the agency theory that 
developed in the early 70s to address the conflict from the divergence between ownership 
and control, it did not suffice in achieving sound governance (Borlea & Achim, 2013). 
Similarly, Clarke studied corporate governance through time by analyzing the different 
eras of corporate governance to chart the evolution of corporate governance over time. 
Clarke's research establishes from the proposition that the agency theory, seen as, the 
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dominant theory in corporate governance, was inadequate to satisfy the demands of 
governance and environmental sustainability (Clarke, 2015). These findings align with 
research by Bell and David (2015) who argued that agency theory destroyed the dignity 
of executives. Besides, Clarke noted that the premise of shareholder primacy that suited 
the era immediately succeeding the industrial revolution was the girding premise of 
agency theory, however having the notion of shareholder primacy as the sole objective 
has wrought continual damage to society and economies (Clarke). Other scholars who 
maintain that agency theory has flaws from its inception echo these criticisms. 
Complementarity of the theories. Business researchers prescribe a 
complementary while others, supplementary theory for the agency theory. The theories 
proposed are the stewardship theory, the stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, 
the transaction cost theory, the political theory, the ethics theory and the theory of 
efficient markets respectively (Borlea & Achim, 2013). All theories are diverse in nature. 
The stakeholder theory esteems the interest of other stakeholders (Hussain, Rigoni, & 
Orij, 2018; Ribe, Ortiz-Marcos, & Uruburu, 2018). Barker and Chiu (2018) 
recommended stakeholder value creation as an ideal requirement for corporate success. 
Unlike the agency theory that is primarily about the maximization of shareholder interest, 
with the stakeholder theory business leaders are focused on the creation of value for all 
stakeholders.  
Bernard et al. (2018) highlighted on the effect of CEO performance and company 
performance with specific emphasis on corporate sustainability and recommended an 
internal control framework that considered the essential role played by external 
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stakeholders. While there are several instances that link corporate governance with 
corporate social responsibility which in turn promote a positive corporate image and 
confidence within the general population, Crifo, Escrig-Olmedo, and Mottis (2018) 
undertook a study that indicated that corporate governance might possess an ambiguous 
role in corporate sustainability depending on the composition and type of the Board of 
Directors. The fashion in which a company positions its corporate strategy has a direct 
bearing on its relationship with its stakeholders and often demarcates the extent to which 
its corporate social responsibility can transcend. Additionally, in alignment with theme 1, 
it is essential for business leaders to consider the qualification and composition of the 
board as it would have a significant bearing on a company's internal control framework 
as regards corporate sustainability. 
To improve business performance in the insurance industry and thereby support 
financial performance, business leaders must make every effort to design an 
organizational architecture with an overarching strategy that would implement a robust 
internal control system and governance mechanismThe essence that each theory had a 
specific focus on an element of governance signifies that a combination of several 
corporate governance theories is the only possibilities foe sound governance.  
CSR and responsible business are essential elements in ascribing levels of 
robustness to corporate governance structures. Clarke (2015) stated that the objective of 
business for wealth creation must adjust to align with the paradigm of sustainability, 
which implies a higher consideration for corporate social and environmental 
responsibility. The findings align with the proposal by Devinney et al. (2013) who said 
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that a firm's CSR solidly anchors in its value proposition statement. Equally, O’Dwyer 
(2003) in defining CSR linked corporate wealth creation and distribution with ethical 
implications. 
The studies highlighting the drawbacks on agency and the associated preeminence 
with shareholder value also contain alternative proposals of other organizational 
dimensions whose consideration may assist in bolstering a sound system of governance. 
Htay, Salman, and Meera (2013) undertook a conceptual analysis study on the main 
conventional corporate governance theories of agency, stewardship, and stakeholder 
theory, highlighted on their deficiencies, and proposed the universal corporate 
governance theory in a bid to fill the void in corporate governance theory. The findings of 
the study by Htay, Salman, and Meera is in alignment with the study Clarke (2015) who 
provided insight on team production theory with a focus shift away from agency theory 
and related shareholder value.  
The Drawback of agency theory. Corporate governance parameters are dynamic 
and continually evolving consequently, overtime a static system would be inadequate to 
assure governance. Clarke (2015) highlighted the essential need to reformulate the 
considerations of corporate governance continually in response to economic, 
environmental, and social changes. Equally, this study is in alignment with the survey by 
Htay et al. (2013) who established the ethical approach theory as a holistic approach to 
fill the gap in corporate governance theory. The study is beneficial to the body of 
knowledge in corporate governance through its role in amplifying the absence of a 
comprehensive theory for sound governance. In addition, Htay et al. illuminated the 
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factors for consideration in establishing corporate governance guidelines by regulatory 
bodies and maintained that a myriad of factors that include culture, politics, and 
regulations, in addition to the stakeholders, shape corporate governance. Hence, any 
theory about governance must encapsulate those factors and maintain cognizance that 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and stakeholder theory were inadequate in grasping 
the totality of corporate governance practices as no one theory provided an all-
encompassing solution.   
Ethics and Governance 
There is a close relationship between ethics and corporate governance. Mees 
(2015) indicated that it is difficult to comprehend wholly corporate governance statutes 
without delving into a topic on business ethics. The codes of corporate governance of 
many nations rarely include ethical provisions, yet most financial scandals entail ethical 
issues (Mallin, 2015). Ethics pertains to moral judgments and is essential as decisions 
made by employees often sway the culture of an organization, which could have 
significant ramification on organizational reputation. 
Considerable evidence is present that the principles that discredit senior executive 
behavior are in agency theory. Bell and David (2015) carried out a study on corporate 
governance with a focus on executive compensation and proposed an alternative theory to 
model the appropriate executive behavior. The authors posited that corporate governance 
is reliant on the agency theory, which fails to portray the action of executives 
appropriately. There are intersections in the study findings by Zaharia and Zaharia (2015) 
and the study by Bell and David as the former authors undertook studies that assessed 
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international business ethics as an essential factor of organizational culture. The authors 
posited that overreliance on rigid guidelines of a governance framework had the potential 
to erode salient features of legal and moral human conduct. The researchers are 
encouraged by the limitations, of agency theory and the code of corporate governance to 
formulate alternative theories in the comprehension of corporate governance.   
A complex world and complexity in theory. The virtue theory has four cardinal 
virtues, which aim to provide positive corporate governance outcome. Bell and David 
(2015) contrasted agency theory and virtue theory as it related to governance and 
provided an executive remuneration model for performance, evaluation, and 
compensation. Equally, in criticizing agency theory, Zaharia and Zaharia (2015) stressed 
that businesses are not in existence purely for short-term profits that benefit the 
shareholder, but for a multitude of functions and goals that would ensure sustainability. 
The societies in which today's global businesses operate provide an assumed 
authorization that companies will operate honestly and responsibly (Zaharia & Zaharia, 
2015). Hence, the findings by these authors are significant in magnifying the reality that 
attainment of a system of sound governance is complex and requires the corroboration of 
numerous factors.  
The code of ethics is the set of procedures formulated by firms to act as a conduct 
guide for staff adherence to ethical standards. Garegnani, Merlotti, and Russo (2015) 
carried out a quantitative research to assess the effect of specific corporate governance 
structures on the quality of the code of ethics in Italy. The authors identified the relation 
between corporate governance structures and effective ethics by assessing the governance 
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structures of executive compensation, the independence of auditors, the primary 
shareholders, and the age and diversity of the CEO. Their findings are essential in the 
understanding of the importance of ethics in the study of governance and align with the 
results by Bell and David (2015) who argued that agency theory trampled and destroyed 
the dignity of executives. Hence, the authors supported the virtue theory of governance, 
which they used to create a remuneration model for the executive theory that provided a 
more favorable image of executive behavior by emphasizing on ethics, integrity, and 
excellence. Garegnani et al. were supportive of the codes of ethics and stated that the 
codes of ethics are pivotal in ensuring CSR, which also facilitates a climate of trust with 
other stakeholders. Hence, ethics in business is essential in adequately handling the 
competing demands of the modern business world. 
High numbers of independent directors often imply a higher propensity toward 
sound governance. Garegnani et al. Russo (2015) negated the conventionally held notion 
in governance literature that a high number of independent directors is synonymous with 
sound corporate governance and provided findings that supported the view that 
companies with key strategic objectives such as sustainable strategic orientation and high 
regard for business ethics required fewer independent directors. Hence, the increasing 
utilization of the codes of ethics could bring about reform to companies, which are 
necessary for ensuring the protection of stakeholder interests. 
Corporate Governance Structures 
Governance is multifaceted, and the corporate governance structures that combine 
to form a governance system is increasingly becoming complex in a dynamic and fast-
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paced world. Corporate governance structures incorporate controls, policies, procedures, 
and guidelines that aid companies in attaining their objectives while also satisfying 
stakeholder needs (Prokhorova & Zakharova, 2016). A corporate governance mechanism 
consists of internal and external techniques. Yasser and Mamun (2015) outlined the use 
of the CEO role and chair of the board of directors as techniques for governance. Shehata 
(2015) expounded on the significance of the codes of corporate governance and described 
its development, and benefits within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The findings 
of these researchers are indicative that corporate governance may involve the use of large 
array structures that are very divergent and still manage to attain the goal of sound 
governance.    
Governance structure and best practice. Researchers continually provide 
rankings to governance structures in a bid to ascertain a set of dominant governance 
structures. Salami, Johl, and Ibrahim (2014) carried out a study to assess the current 
governance structures and their related framework and proposed a new framework for 
corporate governance. The research finding are in alignment with the results by 
Zuckweiler, Rosacker, and Hayes (2016) who undertook a comparative study to assess 
the rank of corporate governance best practices for businesses. Salami et al. proposed a 
governance framework with the following components, ethical behavior, economics, and 
the environmental and social imperatives and integrated the interests of the principal 
stakeholders of a company. Salami et al. contended that the current structures for 
governance were defective as they only served the interest of shareholders. Similarly, in 
highlighting the drawbacks of the current governance structure, which originates from 
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agency theory, Zuckweiler et al. underscored the essential and leading role of strategic 
human resource management and observed that it was in stark contrast with the 
traditional attention placed on the board of directors as the central factor in corporate 
governance. Consequently, the efforts to seek a dominant governance structure are 
essential at indicating the lack of a single central governance structure.   
A robust structure of governance is complex and consists of well-orchestrated and 
coordinated components. Salami et al. (2014) said that the arrangements in place for 
corporate governance had been reactive and not at all holistic and identified the control 
mechanisms conventionally used to safeguard and maximize the wealth of the 
shareholder. The recommendations from the study by Salami et al. are in alignment with 
the survey by Wahba (2015) who stated that no governance structure operated in a 
vacuum and that there are strong interconnections amongst all structures. These 
perspectives are in alignment with the study by Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016), and 
Yeoh (2016) as well as Bester (2015) who emphasized that no single standalone system 
would guarantee an efficient risk management system. Corporate governance is a 
multifaceted, dynamic, and ever evolving. 
Business leaders continually attempt to arrange the structures of governance in a 
sequential order of preeminence. Zuckweiler et al. (2016) identified strategic human 
resource management as the most significant corporate governance structure. The other 
governance structures, in order of priority, are information technology, the board of 
directors, corporate risk management, and internal and external audits together with the 
associated internal control system. In contrast, Wahba (2015) undertook a study that 
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investigated the structures of corporate governance with board characteristics and 
leadership and stated that there was no direct correlation between board characteristics 
and firm performance. There are intersections in the study by Wahba and Zuckweiler et 
al. as Wahba supported the perspective that a duality in corporate governance structure 
with a split in the CEO and chairperson role enhanced firm performance. Hence, although 
there is a lack in the provision of a definitive order of dominance for in the compositions 
of corporate governance, they concur on numerous essential dimensions. 
Corporate Governance in an Integrated Financial Market 
Globalization has a myriad effect on the system and structures of nations. The 
effect of economic globalization is highly reliant a nation’s level of income (Samimi & 
Jenatabadi, 2014). Some business leaders have supported this viewpoint. In contrast, in 
developed and high-income countries, the highlight is on the political and social 
dimensions of globalization (Asongu, 2014). While there are proponents and opponents 
of globalization, many scholars believe that it is not possible for all global citizens to 
benefit equitably in the absence of a mechanism of corporate governance that guarantees 
sound governance.   
Diversity in governance structure. The use of corporate governance structures 
can curtail the issues around tax havens and tax evasion. Gajevszky and Geamanu (2014) 
undertook a descriptive research study that assessed the codes of corporate governance of 
Cyprus and Malta, two countries in Europe considered as tax havens. The authors were 
supportive of the codes of the two nations with the principles and recommendations of 
corporate governance of the OECD. Likewise, Chhillar and Lellapalli (2015) undertook a 
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study that compared and contrasted two corporate governance models, with the 
stockholder model that is predominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries as one, and the 
stakeholder model prevalent in Germany and continental Europe. Chhillar and Lellapalli 
highlighted on the challenges of the agency problem to support the call for a review in 
corporate governance structures and segmented the dimensions of the governance models 
into two categories with an internal and external model. Similarly, Mugarura (2016) 
undertook a correlational research to explore the different corporate governance 
structures from notable emerging nations to determine the critical component for 
financial sustainability for companies operating in a globalized economy. Mugarura 
outlined the set of procedures and rules that define corporate success or failure and 
theorized that in spite of the laws that guarantee success there are extraneous factors most 
notably globalization that play a pivotal role in the success of companies. Mugarura 
posited that corporate governance mechanisms are essential in aligning the several 
constituents parties in and within organizations in a globalized world. The findings in 
these studies synchronize as the researchers were supportive of the codes of governance 
and the national governance structures, and also provided additional dimensions besides 
the codes that must be in place to assure sound governance from the national viewpoint. 
Tax haven. Taxation has a critical role in globalization given the ability that 
individuals and companies possess to potentially distort and erode the tax base of nations 
as investors continually seek jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate. Gajevszky and 
Geamanu (2014) highlighted the manner in which the OECD carried out an exercise to 
integrate the tax havens to create transparency and allow financial disclosure. The authors 
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noted that globalization created several opportunities for economic development and 
growth for businesses and individuals through competitive trade, innovative technology 
and the creation of new markets. The findings and recommendations of this study overlap 
with those of Mugarura (2016) who stated that in a globalized world, corporate 
governance was particularly essential in enhancing the stability of financial markets and 
supporting the profit objectives of companies. Hence, one can construe that success or 
failure may effortlessly result within a globalized integrated market with lax governance 
structures that precipitate exploitation including ills such money laundering.  
Corporate governance systems of a majority of countries typify a blend of two 
models within the governance continuum with the two governance models on either end 
of the continuum. Chhillar and Lellapalli (2015) indicated that while it would be 
advantageous to seek convergence in the code of governance and enable companies to 
operate within a unified framework in the globalized world, it was not feasible to gain 
convergence within the different corporate governance codes. Indeed, globalization has 
deepened the tax race where the country with the lowest tax rate attracts the foreign 
investment. Gajevszky and Geamanu (2014) stated that the tax haven in Malta and Cyrus 
currently operate under a regulated framework that conforms to international standards 
thereby they qualify as whitelisted jurisdictions and that globalization has given 
prominence to tax haven as many multinationals seek ways to take advantage of 
jurisdictions with lower taxes. While Gajevszky and Geamanu were supportive of the 
OECD’s and the European Union’s effort in assuring sound governance, Chhillar and 
Lellapalli advocated for the stakeholder model which does not merely consider the 
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shareholder wealth maximization but also makes considerations for the welfare of other 
stakeholders. Unlike the shareholder model, in the stakeholder model control is mainly 
with the mega institutions. A merger and hostile takeovers such as those within 
shareholder model were highly improbable in the stakeholder model (Chhillar & 
Lellapalli, 2015). The stakeholder model is advantageous, as it possesses a two-tier 
system of governance with the management board and the supervisory board with no dual 
membership to either board. Hence, the initiative of the European Union and the OECD 
in addressing the tax haven has brought a marked change in the way that tax havens 
function. 
Risk Management and Corporate Governance 
Risk management continues to gain prominence in the global financial world. 
Globalization has created an integrated financial and capital market development, which 
creates uncertainty and risk (Aziz et al., 2015). Risk management describes the 
procedures used by companies to identify, control, and mitigate risk (Zuckweiler et al., 
2016). Thomas and Xu (2018) defined risk management as the arrangement that involves 
the comprehensive analysis and management of organizational risk. Sinha and Arena 
(2018) viewed risk composition as an integral feature of an internal control system of any 
entity. Strategic risk management is essential as it continually enables firms to define 
current and long-term objectives for the future. Kim and Yoo (2017) and Timothy and 
Ard-Pieter (2018) highlighted risk management as central to strategic planning and 
objective setting.  Zungu, Sibanda, and Rajaram (2018) stated that firms that aligned risk 
formulation with strategy setting were more successful in mitigating corporate risk. 
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Equally, risk management is essential in its provision of insights to management how to 
reduce and possibly eliminate risk as well as inform about any existing potential 
opportunities. Calandro (2015) stated that the challenge for most business leaders and 
CEO is not mainly in the risk management of known risks but is in the identification, 
assessment, and control of risk and uncertainty that present feeble signals. Today, more 
than ever, executives are cognizant that they continually have to gird, confront, and deal 
with the increasingly higher levels of risk and uncertainty.   
The essence of risk governance. Managerial accountability plays an essential 
role and is the leading cause of the rise in corporate governance establishments in 
corporate America. Annamalah, Raman, Marthandan, and Logeswaran (2018) revealed 
the link between risk management and firm performance. Cheffins (2015) undertook a 
study to identify the trends that gave prominence to corporate governance and determined 
the circumstances that were prevalent which thrust discussions on corporate governance 
to the forefront and said that a lack of enterprise risk management created room for 
misconduct to thrive. The finding of the study are in alignment with the study by Nahar, 
Jubb, and Azim (2016) who undertook an investigative study to assess the correlation 
between risk management and the performance of the financial institutions. The authors 
argued that the increase in the number of the global financial crisis has created an 
emphasis on governance performance and risk. Increased governance is in alignment with 
the views of Maxfield, Wang, and Mariana Magaldi (2018) who observed that there was 
an increasing awareness to governance structures after the financial crisis. Still, there are 
notable deviations in the finding by Cheffins (2015) and by Nahar et al. as Cheffins 
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highlighted on corporate governance as fundamental for structuring and controlling 
companies. The authors noted that a lack of a significant shareholder in most publicly 
listed companies resulted in the absence of a dominant shareholder. A shortage of a 
principal shareholder, who would generate an internal influence and control, 
inadvertently creates a risky situation or governance risk. On the other hand, Nahar et al. 
stated that in the past, the understanding was merely that risk identification, control, and 
disclosure led to reductions in the conflict in interest between the principal and the agent, 
while simultaneously improving company performance. The findings in both studies are 
indicative of the essential role that risk governance plays in the modern complex and 
globalized business arena. The role of risk governance subsequent to the onslaught of the 
numerous global financial crises is impossible to overstate.    
A simple goal of profit maximization with unbridled risk is detrimental to 
companies, the financial systems, and any local communities. There are notable 
intersections in the studies by Nahar et al. (2016), Cheffins (2015), and Lenssen, 
Dentchev, and Roger (2014) as Nahar et al. presented an integrative approach of risk 
management and governance as the solution to sustainable businesses as well as 
identified the governance mechanisms that would reduce risks in the global business 
environment. The recommendations by Lenssen et al. are in alignment with those 
advocated by Schneider and Scherer (2015) and Saggar and Singh (2017) as they all lay 
emphasis on the role of sustainable business and CSR in the attainment of a system of 
sound governance. Schneider and Scherer stated that several international companies 
discover that maintaining a global business may imply a thrust to business locations 
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lacking a democratic state and with a weakened regulatory framework. The authors 
contended that these challenges which result from globalization test the leading 
governance approach that places the shareholder as the critical player in corporate 
governance and also magnifies the core deficiency of the agency theory. These findings 
are in alignment with the perspective espoused by Clarke (2015) and Kultys (2016) as 
they all highloghted on the main limitations of the agency theory. Schneider and Scherer 
supported the notion of democratization of corporate governance as the solution to 
challenges of increased risk in integrated global markets. Hence, the complexities of 
today's globalized business environment project a bright light at the glaring weakness of 
the agency theory as the complex and dynamic financial institutions of the modern age 
requires a well-formulated and an integrative system of governance where risk 
management at its core. 
Corporate governance and corporate responsibility possess key linkages that 
weave core elements of their themes together. Lenssen et al. (2014) identified five levels 
to governance for sustainability and provided the example of the global financial crisis 
that ensued from the sub-prime mortgage to illustrate the systemic effect that this type of 
misconduct had on the economy. The authors demonstrated that corporate responsibility 
and governance together were inadequate in addressing risk management and its effect on 
a company. The finding by Lenssen et al. is in alignment with those of Schneider and 
Scherer (2015) who undertook a study to explore the effect of risk on corporate 
governance. Their study assessed the role an integrated market had on the incidences of 
risk. The authors highlighted the manner in which risks posed a threat to corporate 
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legitimacy where continually companies find that the globalized business environment 
may imply operating under conditions of weak rules and political governance failure. 
Their findings are significant in the provision of evidence that no single solution suffices 
to guarantee a robust risk management solution and governance in an integrated global 
financial market. 
Transition  
In Section 1, I commenced with setting the background of the problem, the 
problem, and purpose statement, the nature of the study, the research, and interview 
questions. I outlined the agency theory within the conceptual framework. Agency theory 
is theory that best aligns with the research question of this study. I made provision for the 
meaning of the operating definitions followed by a listing of the assumptions, limitation, 
and delimitations of this study.  
I completed section 1 with a review of current literature on the fundamental 
aspects pivotal to the discussion and study on corporate governance and provided an 
analysis of the perspective on the framework and structures formulated to enhance 
corporate governance. In the section of the literature review, I underscored the attempts 
by various scholars and business leaders to find a lasting solution that result in sound 
corporate governance for companies.  
In Section 2, I detailed a depiction of this research project. The descriptions 
included the role of the researcher, participant, and the research method and design for 
this study. Documentation comprises the data collection instruments, techniques, and data 
analysis methods. Lastly, in this section, I outlined the role of the researcher and finally 
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provided the methods used to guarantee the validity and the reliability of this study. In 
Section 3, I described the findings, implications, and application for professional practice 
and the recommendations for action and further research.  
77 
 
Section 2: The Project 
In this section, I elaborated on the research method and design used to address the 
problem and purpose of this study. To do this, I expanded on the appropriateness of the 
selected research methodology and design. I also detailed the role of the researcher, the 
technique used to select participants, and the methods for data collection and analysis. 
Lastly, I elaborated on the steps taken to assure the validity and reliability of results.   
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the corporate 
governance strategies insurance business leaders use to support financial performance. 
The targeted population consisted of business leaders from seven insurance companies in 
the corporate sector in Austria who have used successful corporate governance strategies 
to support financial performance. Implications for positive social change include the 
potential to reduce negative influences from misgovernance that allow companies to 
remain profitable which is beneficial for employees and investors and the potential for 
continuing or widening access to insurance for residents, which allows investors and the 
local community to benefit from improved corporate governance.  Implications for 
positive social change also include the potential for provision of stable employment 
opportunities and the restoration of local community trust in insurance companies’ 
investment portfolios, which is beneficial to investors and the local community. With my 
findings, I may enable positive social change by providing knowledge on the strategies 
that businesses may use to avoid financial scandal and support strong insurance 
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institutions where investors, employees, and the local community have confidence in the 
stability and financial performance of the insurance industry. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher is essential in mitigating biases and subjectivity for a 
study. In qualitative research, the researcher gathers information and is the instrument for 
data assembly. The researcher is the primary research instrument (Sze & Tan, 2014). I 
was the researcher who undertook this study and explored the corporate governance 
strategies insurance business leaders use to support financial performance. Researchers 
have a more etic role than an emic role. The etic role refers to the viewpoint from without 
while the emic refers to the viewpoint from within a social group. Researchers who use 
the emic role assume the role of an insider such as an active participant during a 
phenomenological study and researchers who assume the etic role take on an external 
view from peripheral or outside perspective such as an objective viewer (Cui, 2014). 
Qualitative research has considerable variations ranging from a purely etic or emic role to 
a blend of the two roles.   
I am interested in issues associated with corporate governance, as I have been able 
to amass a considerable body of knowledge on various aspects of the topic. The main 
subject of my graduate thesis was transparency and regulatory compliance, which is part 
of the broader topic of corporate governance. There is no accompanying personal 
connection to the research topic of this study. 
I kept a journal and wrote personal thoughts, reflections, and views about this 
research study and immediately mitigated any bias. Chikweche and Flatcher (2012) said 
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that it is essential to be fully cognizant of biases that may impair the objectivity or the 
opinion of a researcher. Preferences blur a researcher’s ability to provide an impartial 
view of research accounts that form from one’s background or upbringing (Maxwell, 
2013). Biases have the potential to distort an accurate picture and affect the validity and 
reliability of research findings.  
The Belmont Report of 1979 is essential in research as it outlines the basic ethical 
principles for carrying out ethical research. The Belmont Report has provisions when 
involving humans in experimental research. Belmont report has specific examples where 
the use of research participants may be construed as posing a potential for high ethical 
risk (Bracken-Roche, Bell, Macdonald, & Racine, 2017). In keeping with the Belmont 
Report, I asked the interview participants to sign a consent form before the actual 
interview. I informed the interview participants that they could withdraw from the study 
at any time and included information on how they may withdraw without penalty. I 
requested the interview participants to review my summary of interview responses to 
assess credibility through member-checking. Harper and Cole (2012) defined member-
checking as a method used to evaluate the credibility of results which works through 
restating, reconfirmation of transcripts and the confirmation of summaries by participants 
to determine accuracy. Hence, to mitigate biases during data collection and analysis, I 
took notes and relied participant confirmation of transcripts and summaries to assess any 
experiences that may have caused the omission of or overly emphasized specific accounts 
of my research findings.  
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As the primary research instrument, I established an interview protocol which  
strengthened the quality of data obtained and enabled a focused and meaningful data 
collection process that captured the account of the participants. I used semistructured 
interviews. Researchers use semistructured interviews to obtain a detailed report from a 
participant when addressing a research question (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). I used a 
smartphone for recording digital media and replayed recordings to ensure the validity and 
accuracy of my findings as well as reconfirm all the details of my summary 
Participants 
Selection of participants is pivotal for any research. Allwood (2012) advocated 
that the idea behind qualitative research is the intentional selection of participants with 
knowledge that would best enhance research. I chose seven business leaders of 
companies who are involved in high strategic management and planning positions 
responsible for setting and making governance-related decisions and have used successful 
corporate governance strategies to support financial performance in the insurance 
industry.   
Planning and formulating corporate governance strategies demands the expertise 
of specialists in that field (Othman & Rahman, 2014). I also established a prerequisite 
during initial phone conversations to determine whether my interview participants had 
the authority to represent and speak on behalf of the organization. I consulted with the 
Global Federation of Insurance Associations (GFIA), the international insurance agency 
who sets standards and compliance measures, as well as industry-specific positions 
regarding best practices on insurance matters. Formulation of eligibility criteria for study 
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participants is an essential component of research and has the potential to influence the 
sufficiency of data collection (Lopez-Dicastillo & Belintxon, 2014). The eligibility 
criteria for research participants describe the vital characteristics for participants which in 
turn aid in the achievement of accurate results.  
I ensured that the seven business leaders were knowledgeable regarding the 
process of governance and could authoritatively speak about how management decisions 
affect or impede the framework of governance. I reviewed the company website of each 
participant and checked that each participant is acquainted with the organizational 
structure of the senior management team, and obtained the central contact details of the 
front office of the seven insurance companies of my study. As part of the interview 
protocol process, I contacted the interview participants and made an introduction of my 
research study, obtained specific business, and position related information about each 
participant. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) and Parlalis (2011) recommended such an 
acquaintance and reconnaissance procedure as part of the interview protocol. 
Subsequently, I sent out consent forms by post and email before the interviews wherein I 
also elaborated to the participants by phone regarding the objective and requirements of 
the interview. The process of contacting and informing participants guarantees that the 
research participants are fully aware of the process and are sufficiently knowledgeable 
(Rawson & Hughes-Hassell, 2015). Qualitative researchers uphold the strategy of 
selecting suitable participants for the purpose of a research study (Robinson, 2014; 
Trotter, 2012). I established a checklist on which I recorded each completed consent form 
as a mandatory process prior to the commencement of data collection.   
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A researcher’s ability to work together with researcher participants is beneficial 
for the successful conclusion of the interview process. Gill (2014), a scholarly researcher, 
communicated with participants by telephone and through a face-to-face meeting to build 
rapport and trust before discussing the finer details of the research objective. I sent simple 
introductory emails and then met face-to-face with the seven participants and created an 
appropriate working relationship before undertaking the semistructured interviews. 
Research Method and Design  
Research Method 
The three broad categories of research methods are quantitative, qualitative, and 
the mixed method approach (Venkatesh et al., 2016). The quantitative approach is the 
empirical study of phenomena that uses statistical techniques, while researchers use the 
qualitative method to gain a solid understanding of a particular organization or event and 
is most appropriate for a study of subjects without quantifiable variables (Özer et al., 
2015). The key difference in the research methods is about how each method is used. 
Allwood (2012) described qualitative research as the research that seeks to study and 
analyze items in their original setting to decipher a phenomenon regarding the meanings 
people hold and attach to them.  
Bailey (2014) stated that qualitative research traced its origin to applied 
psychology and noted that it is a research methodology providing a comprehensive 
perspective on participants' view. In qualitative research, data gathering is in the language 
of the informant while in quantitative research data reporting is through statistical 
analysis (Bristowe, Selman, & Murtagh, 2015). I used the qualitative research method to 
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undertake my study. The qualitative research method was the most appropriate to fulfill 
the requirements of my research that explored the corporate governance strategies to 
support financial performance.  
In quantitative research method, the statistical and numerical measures are the 
means used to undertake empirical investigation of social phenomena (Barnham, 2012). 
Quantitative research is more objective and reliable, with a reduced level of researcher 
subjectivity (Yilmaz, 2013). With quantitative research, a general assumption is the 
existence of a constant and measurable reality (Thamhain, 2014). The thrust of my 
research was to explore the successful strategies of shareholders without the need to use a 
hypothesis to test statistical variables. A quantitative research method was not suitable for 
my study.  
Researchers use the qualitative and quantitative approaches to design research in 
the mixed or hybrid research method (Caruth, 2013). While many researchers rely 
heavily on either the quantitative or qualitative research method, it may be beneficial to 
incorporate the advantages of both research methodologies in some instances (Christ, 
2013). The quantitative and qualitative methods are essential when using the mixed 
research method hence this research method was not the optimal methodology for my 
study. Integration of data and hypothesis is essential to the mixed method research design 
hence researchers recommend the inclusion of at least three distinct hypotheses in this 
research methodology (Zohrabi, 2013). These recommendations are essential in 
guaranteeing that a mixed method research can deliver a strong tool for exploring 
complex processes.  
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Research Design  
A comprehensive and well-considered research design is essential for the 
successful completion and delivery of research objectives. Research design is the 
elaborate description of procedures for researching a systematic and logical format to 
accomplish a research objective and resolve a research problem (Caruth, 2013). 
Qualitative researchers use designs of grounded theory, ethnographic, phenomenological, 
narrative, and case studies (Yin, 2013). The narrative research and grounded theory are 
not suitable research designs for the Walden DBA study as the faculty emphasizes on the 
practical application of putting theory into practice to bring about social change and 
resolve business issues. 
The case study design was the most appropriate of the remaining three research 
designs. The case study is the exploration of a program, event, or an activity (Petty et al., 
2012). I conducted a multiple case study of selected companies in Austria and contributed 
to the practice of the corporate governance strategies insurance companies’ leaders use to 
support corporate financial performance. 
The case study is an excellent research design for gathering a plethora of ideas 
and views on human behavior. Case study has its origin in anthropology, medicine, 
sociology, and psychology (Yilmaz, 2013). The case study approach has a broad thrust 
for potential future research as well as a unique capability for flexibility that is 
advantageous for researchers interested in uncovering complexities in behavior. Taylor 
and Thomas-Gregory (2015) itemized and noted that case study augurs well when the 
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purpose of a research study  intends to complement a psychological study or reveal a 
unique phenomenon.   
The case study approach has notable shortcomings in spite its prominent 
advantages. A primary limitation of the case study design is the potential for inherent 
biases in data collection analysis and interpretation from the viewpoint of a singular 
person. The deduction of a correlation or causal-effect relationship is impossible with 
case study research despite the fact that case study offers researchers excellent chances of 
uncovering phenomena from a myriad angles (Rawson, & Hughes-Hassell, 2015). 
There is a possibility to trace the origin and the specific field of social science 
responsible for the foundation of the ethnographical approach. The ethnographic 
approach originates from the field of anthropology where the initial focus of the field was 
the study of groups or organizations' cultures (Cincotta, 2015). The main aim of 
ethnography is the exploration of various cultural phenomena. The ethnographic 
approach is distinguishable given its notable feature of participant observation in 
undertakings to modest research (Simpson, Slutskaya, Hughes, & Simpson, 2014). My 
study had no exploratory intention to understand groups’ cultures; consequently, the 
ethnographic design was not suitable for my study on the corporate governance strategies 
to support financial performance. 
Researchers use the phenomenological approach to address the meanings of 
subjective experiences of different people and their interpretation of the world. Englander 
(2016) noted that researchers use the phenomenological approach, a scientific discipline, 
to examine a phenomenon from the subjective perspective of participants. The 
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phenomenological approach has some distinct benefits. Firstly, the phenomenological 
approach has an advantage that provides to qualitative research design and method, the 
ability to view varied perspectives of the experience of participants, and especially at 
specific moment or point in history (Rawson & Hughes-Hassell, 2015). Secondly, 
researchers using the phenomenological approach will benefit from a plethora of precious 
data derived from the shared experience of participants (Caruth, 2013). Notwithstanding 
these notable merits, the phenomenological approach has its share of weakness.  
Given the subjective nature of the phenomenological approach, it may be 
daunting for researchers to prevent biases. The subjectivity may undermine the efforts to 
establish validity and reliability. Allwood (2012) specified that the intensely qualitative 
attribute of phenomenological approach presents researchers with the challenge of 
summarizing, deducing, and presenting finding. Unlike other methods with the chance for  
generalization, the phenomenological approach does not provide any generalizable data. 
The sample sizes involved in phenomenological approach are minor which imply that it 
is near impossible to refer or categorize an experience as typical (Bailey, 2014). The 
essence of research design in the phenomenological approach did not align well with my 
study focus on the corporate governance strategies to support financial performance, 
irrespective of the merits of the phenomenological approach.  
Data saturation is a method researchers use to guarantee the accuracy and validity 
of data in qualitative research. Failure to attain data saturation would make feeble the 
quality of a research study (Fusch & Ness, 2015). While it may be easier to ascertain the 
point of data saturation in quantitative research definitively, it is a more daunting task in 
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qualitative research. I attained data saturation when additional data did not yield any new 
themes, and when there was sufficient data to respond to my research questions 
effectively. 
Qualitative researchers use several forms of data collection that include an 
interview, the collection of documents, and audio recording. During the data collection 
phase, I gathered publicly available documentation that consisted of the financial rules as 
well as the annual financial statements, and records that supplemented my primary data 
collection. I noted down the relevant observations from the seven organizations that I 
visited when conducting my interviews. I checked whether other forms of data collection 
corroborated with my assessment of the knowledge base of the interview participants. 
Triangulation is the presentation of several sources of data and is essential in enhancing 
reliability (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Triangulation is an essential part of the fulfillment of 
data saturation.  
Population and Sampling  
Selection of participants is pivotal as an appropriate choice can best inform and 
enhance the knowledge demand in pursuance of a particular study research. In qualitative 
research, the critical determinant in the successful management of population sampling is 
the intentional selection and delineation of participants that would best enrich research 
(Emerson, 2015). The scope of this study was a multiple case study research of seven 
insurance industries located in Austria. I chose seven business leaders of companies who 
are in top strategic management and planning positions responsible for setting, making 
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governance related decisions, and who have successfully used corporate governance 
strategies to support financial performance in the insurance industry.   
A researcher may use various sampling approaches that include census, 
convenience, purposeful or the snowball methods. I used purposive sampling for this 
research study. Purposive sampling is a procedure where a researcher relies on his 
judgment in selecting members of the population to take part in a research study 
(Robinson, 2014). Purposive sampling is subjective sampling and requires that a set of 
selection criteria be set out prior to the selection of sample within the sphere of those 
criteria. The technique I selected for this study involved choosing suitable business 
leaders who are knowledgeable on with the process of governance and can authoritatively 
speak about how management decisions affect or impede the framework of governance. 
Onwuegbuzie and Byers (2014) encouraged qualitative researchers to involve thoroughly 
versed interview participants who possess the requisite knowledge on the objective of the 
research. Elo et al. (2014) specified that the level of grasp of interview participants 
should comprise the requirements for involvement in qualitative study research. To 
commence the process, I obtained the current publication of the Austrian Financial 
Market Authority (FMA), which is the authority responsible for the insurance market. 
The Federal Ministry of Finance oversees the FMA. In the publication from the FMA is 
an outline of the financial performance of primary insurance and reinsurance companies 
in Austria as well as the depictions of the general trends across various insurance sectors. 
I exercised my judgment basing upon the criterion of corporate success and 
selected seven case studies to ensure proper representation and best inform my research 
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study. White, Oelke, and Friesen (2012) indicated that it is to the advantage of research 
for researchers to select interview participants who can provide broad and multiple 
viewpoints of their experience and scope. Subsequently, I contacted my interview 
participants by email and telephone and asked pertinent questions to gauge their skills in 
the process of governance.  
My research study consisted of seven participants. Yin (2013) recommended a 
sample size limit of 10 participants for a case study. Data saturation is the process of data 
gathering, assembling, and analysis to a level when new data will yield no further insight 
(Jessiman, 2013). Unlike quantitative research that is highly reliant on the precision of 
data, qualitative research relies on data saturation criterion to ensure validity. Data 
saturation is a hallmark for high-quality research (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Marshall, Cardon, 
Poddar, & Fontenot, 2015). I carried out semistructured interviews on a small sample size 
of seven, which provided rich and detailed information that met my research objective.  
I attained data saturation when additional data yielded no new themes and when 
there was sufficient data to respond to my research questions effectively. I safeguarded 
that my research study attained data saturation, the point where additional data yielded no 
new insight or evidence, even though no single definitive method can conclusively assure 
data saturation. In addition to the semistructured interviews, I obtained pertinent data 
from online insurance organizational records and reports from the regulatory authorities 





The ethical matters that may occur with the use of humans as participants in 
ethical research are pertinent to ethical research. Ethical research serves to ascertain that 
research undertakings remain ethically sound (Bromley, Mikesell, Jones, & Khodyakov, 
2015). Each research has its stipulations and potential set of ethical issues. As a 
prerequisite each researcher must review such stipulation and be fully conversant. 
(Hirschberg, Kahrass, & Strech, 2014). Hence, possession of the knowledge and the 
fulfillment of each ethical requirement will aid researchers in publishing work that is 
ethically sound.  
As a qualitative researcher, I undertook the process and steps that helped my 
study align with the IRB requirements. I sufficiently apprised the participants of the 
entire interview process, informed of the interview, and provided with a consent form for 
their completion and signature. The informed consent is a document that participants 
must sign as evidence of their agreement to take part in study research (Thomson, 
Roberts, & Bittles, 2014). On the consent form, participants found pertinent information 
concerning my research study including the primary intention of my research, the 
potential benefits, associated risks, and the specific description of procedural 
performances.     
In keeping with the principles of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) on the 
rights of participants, I initiated the interview process in advance of the actual proposed 
interview date and discussed the informed consent process with my interview 
participants. The IRB functions to protect the rights of human subjects in research 
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endeavors as stipulated by the federal regulations (Kumar, 2013). I guaranteed that all 
interview participants received sufficient information on their rights including withdrawal 
rights from the research study and interview. As indicated by Thrope (2014) on the 
provisions of the Belmont report, I appraised the interview participants with knowledge 
on the precise manner in which a withdrawal without penalty would occur. Upon 
conclusion of my discussion, I requested the participants to complete and sign the consent 
form.  
Together with the consent form, I informed the participants that there was neither 
any financial contribution nor monetary compensation resulting from participating in the 
research. I notified the participants that participation in the study was valuable in 
providing essential knowledge on the key strategies to ensure sound corporate 
governance and support financial performance. The results of this study could also be of 
value to the practice of business as insurance business leaders may use this information to 
devise corporate governance strategies to increase profitability. 
To guarantee the ethical protection of the participants and in keeping with the 
mandatory requirements to complete the IRB application form, I applied for an IRB 
approval from Walden University before commencing data collection for my research. I 
was granted a permit with the IRB approval number 07-16-18-0661415 when it was 
confirmed that my research and subject conformed to the ethical standards set by the 
IRB. The desire to protect the interest of participants, minimize and mitigate possible 
risk, and uphold the trust and confidentiality of research participants led to the 
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establishment of the ethical standards of the IRB (Erlich & Narayanan, 2014). The receipt 
of approval is indicative of adherence to the criteria of the IRB.  
The stipulations of the IRB are that research subjects are sufficiently aware of the 
benefits and of the risks that may emanate from conducting research. Unlike quantitative 
research, it may not be possible to protect the anonymity of participants, though 
qualitative researchers can guarantee their confidentiality. The Belmont report supports 
beneficence; the principle of privacy and confidentiality with the aim of preserving 
research participants from harm or risk that result from information disclosure (Doyle & 
Veranas, 2014). I reassured the interview participants of the steps that I undertook to 
safeguard their confidentiality. Hence, I distorted the characteristics of the participants 
and relied on pseudonyms to refer to participants and their locations so that data given 
was not traceable to participants. I used alphanumeric codes (P1 and incrementally) to 
identify participants and pseudonyms for labeling organizations.  
Breaches of confidentiality have the potential to ruin public trust in future 
research. Neusar (2014) stated that the deductive disclosure results when features of a 
person become discernible in research. To protect confidentially, I made sure that no 
identification or company details was visible on data collection materials. Subsequent to 
the data collection phase, I delivered a summary of the findings from the study to the 
interview participants. I informed the participants that the final research document 
included the Walden IRB approval number, and that I will keep the details of the study 
securely and safely for 5 years to safeguard their rights.  
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Data Collection Instruments  
In a qualitative research study, the researcher is the primary data collection 
instrument. A data collection instrument is the device for gathering research data (Morse, 
2015). The research method and design of a research study determine the appropriate data 
collection instrument and technique. Data collection instrument is an essential feature of 
research on which its reliability and validity depend (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). I 
handled my role with care when I observed and transcribed participants’ responses to 
guarantee reliability and validity.  
I was the primary research instrument in this research study, which included 
multiple data sources to guarantee triangulation. Researchers have the chance of using 
various data sources for triangulation in a case study research (Strauss & Corbin, 2014; 
Yin, 2014). I collected data using semistructured interviews and explored the strategies 
insurance business leaders use to ensure sound corporate governance and support 
financial performance.  
The semistructured interviews are open-ended and provide with the chance of 
gathering rich data and establishing clarity. Moagi (2016) indicated that semistructured 
interviews are essential as through them a researcher can draw connections between 
multiple data forms. However, Walker et al. (2015) stated that semistructured interviews 
might be time-consuming and laborious to design. Notwithstanding, interview questions 
are developed based on their significance to meet the purposes of a research study. 
Semistructured interviews offer the interviewees the chance to provide their insights 
suitably and conveniently. 
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I used actively listening as a research instrument to gather data that guarantee 
sound corporate governance and support financial performance. I also listened to senior 
executives in the insurance industry as they can best speak authoritatively on behalf of 
the organization and can make strategic decisions on behalf of the insurance 
organizations they represent. I carefully listened to the responses provided by each 
interview participants, and I transcribed data to capture each answer precisely. Widodo 
(2014) specified that transcription of data is essential in qualitative research as it captures 
and deciphers the meanings of naturally occurring phenomena.  
I used the process of triangulation to ensure the validity and reliability of data. I 
gathered archival documents that included publicly available published financial 
statements and annual reports, and records to supplement the primary data collection of 
the critical items of corporate governance to support financial performance within the 
insurance industry. I also enhanced the validity and reliability of the data collection 
instruments and relied on member checking peer reviews and member checking. Harper 
and Cole (2012) defined member checking as a method used to evaluate the credibility of 
results. Harvey (2012) stated that member checking improves credibility. Rohrbeck and 
Gemünden (2011) specified that the use of a wide array of sources of data collection is 
essential in confirming triangulation. Hopf, Francis, Helms, Haughney, and Bond (2016) 
in the research study on the core requirements for successful data linkage, used the 
triangulation protocol for a systematic comparison of findings between the different 
methods. A triangulation protocol is a comprehensive process, which lists the whole 
manner of handling a triangulation for qualitative studies (Harvey, 2015; Hopf et al., 
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2016). Hence, triangulation was beneficial for this research as it provided for cross-
validation, which aided in attainment of consensus and validated the results from data 
collection.  
I used an interview protocol to safeguard consistency with the interviews and 
assist with time management. Castillo-Montoya (2016) stated the use of an interview 
protocol enhances the quality of research data. I have included the following document in 
the appendices, Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Questions.    
Data Collection Techniques 
I conducted a qualitative, multiple case study to explore the strategies insurance 
business leaders use for corporate governance to support financial performance. The 
target population was the business leaders from seven insurance companies in the 
corporate sector in Austria. The primary data collection instruments that I used were 
interviewing and archival materials retrieved online or from the office premises of the 
participants. 
Researchers have a wide array of resources at their disposal for data collection. 
Notwithstanding, a strong relationship is present between data types and the method used 
to collect such data. McCarthy, Wagner, and Sanders (2017) detailed that even though the 
techniques for data collection and analysis are similar for all research design methods, the 
manner of performance reporting differs significantly. Marshall and Rossman (2016) 
noted that in qualitative research, interviews, observations, and archival materials are the 
primary sources of data around which data collection technique depend.     
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Each data collection technique possesses specific merits and demerits. 
Questionnaires are cost-effective with the potential to cover a large population within a 
short period. However, they are often impersonal with a limited provision for face-to-face 
interaction, unlike interview process, which offers the advantage of assessing 
respondents' understanding (Andraski, Chandler, Powell, Humes, & Wakefield, 2014; 
Yin, 2014). I collected data using interviews due to the advantages they offer. The 
benefits of the interviews include the opportunity to pose follow-up questions as well as a 
setting to observe participant and their gestures to obtain non-verbal cues, which may 
complement participant responses. Notwithstanding, interview process has some notable 
demerits. They can be time-consuming especially when there is a need for additional time 
for member checking, and an interviewer has the potential to influence the interview 
responses by posing leading the questions. Hence, it is essential that a researcher take 
necessary precaution to minimize the potential shortcomings from the usage of each data 
collection technique.    
I also relied on information from archival materials to complement my data 
collection techniques and mitigate possible disadvantages of using the interview. 
Observations are advantageous because they provide a direct method to capture and 
collect data, which implies that the data is accurate and highly reliable. The demerits of 
observation are its failure to capture past occurrences and its inherent limitation of 
impossibility at observing opinions (Morse, 2015). By using archival materials, I stood to 
benefit from its cost-effectiveness and the chance of obtaining historical data that span 
several years which provided with an ability to observe critical trends and features. 
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Notwithstanding, an archival material may be outdated and unreliable (Smith, 2012; Yin, 
2014). Nonetheless, I contemplated that the use of a dual data collection technique 
potentially allowed for the merits of one to mitigate the limitations of the other.   
I established an interview protocol and consulted well in advance with the 
interviewees by email and phone. Appendix A: contains the details of the interview 
protocol for use by this research. Once the consultative process with the interviewees was 
completed, I arranged a face-to-face meeting prior to commencing with the interviews, to 
establish a purposeful working relationship. Silverman (2013) advocated the use of pre-
sessional interview consultation as it enhances the quality of a proposed research. 
Castillo-Montoya (2016) in formulating the interview- protocol refinement framework, 
said that with the use of an interview protocol researchers could increase the quality of 
data they obtain from research interviews. Hence, it is beneficial for qualitative 
researchers to use semistructured interview protocol as a planning tool to conduct 
research. 
I also established a systematic follow-up process for the interview protocol and 
ensured that it was in accordance to plan. I ensured that the data collection was handled 
professionally with due diligence and that care was exercised to guarantee that the 
numerous steps and recommendation of data collection were adhered for interviews, 
audio recordings, and archival documents. I arranged for member check subsequent to 
concluding the interview process and during data analysis by providing a summary of the 
interview, and by posing questions to the participants to determine the accuracy of data 
findings. The process of member checking served to decrease the incidence of incorrect 
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data and misrepresentation (Reilly, 2013). I used member checking to help in increasing 
the credibility and validity of my study.  
Data Organization Techniques  
I used several data organization techniques to systematical order, arrange, and sort 
the data obtained using the data collection instruments and for the data collection 
techniques defined for this study. A researcher has the responsibility of organizing data in 
a consistent and orderly fashion that can quickly enable third-party scrutiny for 
objectivity (Silverman, 2013). An essential component of data organization vests in the 
ability to confirm the objectivity of the methods used to organize data.  
As part of the interview protocol, I commenced by obtaining the consent of the 
research participants for participation in the study and for audio recording of the entire 
interview process. Digital recording technologies present a unique opportunity for 
documenting sonic expressions (Smith, 2016). The signed consent is an assurance of 
participant agreement in my commencement of the audio recording on my laptop and the 
digital recording on a smartphone. I tested all the recording gadgets prior to the actual 
interview to guarantee that the auditory and digital recorder was in good working order 
and the result of a mock recording was audible enough to permit the transcription of data.    
I used a notepad and research diary to aid me with proper documentation and the 
organization of the substantial amount of data gathered from the research study. Jacob 
and Furgerson (2012) kept a folder with their interview. I took notes throughout the data 
collection phase. Notetaking and maintaining a journal inspires researchers to encapsulate 
their reasoning about descriptions that reflect personal experiences and situations 
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(Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013; Marshall & Rossman, 2015; Yin, 2014). I 
arranged the diary in chronological order for each participant and referenced the publicly 
available documents provided at the interview, in the journal with a cross-reference to a 
catalog for all materials and archival documents provided.   
Creation of a sequence for labeling and storing interview materials, and archival 
material is essential to a system of sound data management. I created a precise form for 
labeling all the materials provided and gathered prior and during my interview. The 
labelling sequence was intuitive and involved the use of a name order that was indicative 
of the information stored in each file. Documentation of data and the use of an 
appropriate technique for data organization are essential to maintaining data integrity and 
enabling the efficient process of research data analysis (Grossoehme, 2014). Labeling and 
cataloging in a structured form increase the propensity for achieving a high quality of 
data finding as well as guarantees ease with the retrieval of research data.  
I recorded the interviews and revisited them by listening to the recordings. I used 
MAXQDA for windows software for data analysis to reassemble data by the coding of 
each concept and the identification of emergent themes. I also provided each interview 
participant with a copy of the transcript of each interview including a summary of the 
findings and conclusions from the study in a document of two pages. The protocol of 
transcribing data with subsequent member checking would enhance the reliability and 
validity of collected data (McCarthy et al., 2017). Subsequently, I kept each recording 
together with the transcribed data, related archival materials, and the digital records 
securely in access-by-code devices for 5 years following which destruction of all data 
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will take place.   
Data Analysis 
After my interview and transcribing the interview process, I began the process of 
data analysis by considering all the data collected using the data collection methods and 
the data collection techniques for this research study. I reviewed the data from the 
interview, observation, audio recordings, documents and all archival records. For 
qualitative research, the steps of data analysis involve the entire process that 
systematically compiles and organizes data for meaningful analysis to permit the 
formation of themes by coding and the subsequent representation of data (Kornbluh, 
2015). Hence, data analysis incorporates numerous interlinked steps with activities that 
form part of data analysis and representation. 
I followed Yin's process of a five interlinked steps for data analysis. Yin (2014) 
advocated for the use of a five-step non-linear approach for compiling the database, 
disassembling data, reassembling data, interpreting data, and making conclusions about 
data.  I will discuss each step in greater detail.  
Compiling a Database 
Compilation of a database involves the collection of data from research in a 
structured manner. The main types of qualitative data that I gathered included structured 
and unstructured text, audio and visual recordings (Rowley, 2012; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; 
Yin, 2014). I commenced with the organization of data by transcribing, data cleaning, 
and labeling the data. I replayed the audio recording to safeguard the accuracy of the 
transcribed data.  
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I anticipated that the size of data collection under this research study was 
voluminous hence requiring systematic analysis (Burnap, Avis, & Rana, 2013; Yin, 
2014). I organized the transcribed data and archival documents chronologically and in a 
sequential manner to a clean layout that was easy to retrieve. The process involved the 
initial structuring, labeling, and defining the data.  
Disassembling Data  
A clean and organized database provides the benefit of a quick, easy, and speedy 
access of specific data. Such a database enables users to access data and leave data intact 
when a layered structure is in place for the database. With the compilation in place, I 
proceeded with breaking out the data to smaller fragments, which made it easy when 
working with tiny segments of the entire data without losing track or disorganizing the 
database. I also used a coding system for each section of data, and I used a code that was 
easily identifiable and recognizable. Coding is the manner of categorization of data to 
facilitate analysis (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Yin, 2013). From each segment that emerged 
from disassembling, I assigned a code to enable easy tracking and the specificity of data 
types.  
I repeated the disassembling process during reassembling and the interpreting of 
data stages, to verify the validity of my coding and the emergence of themes. The 
constant review and prodding of recurring concepts will facilitate accurate identification 
of the emergent themes. During coding, it is imperative for researchers to be cognizant 
that incorporating all the information supplied by research participants is not required 
(Derobertmasure & Robertson, 2014; Yin, 2013). I engaged an iterative process for an 
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orderly compilation of data which was succeeded by the disassembling phase where data 
was broken to tags and then reassembled to cluster groups as theme emerged.  
Reassembling Data  
The next step involved the reassembling of data to align with the identification of 
the new framework on the process of disassembling data. As qualitative research presents 
with rich contextualized data and images, which may be a challenge to research if the 
data volume is immense (Fielding, 2012; Kornbluh, 2015; O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). To 
counter this challenge, I used computer-aided software for qualitative data analysis.  
Once a framework of coding was in place, I reassembled the data by aligning to 
fit the newly created coding system. To proceed, I relied on a computer software to help 
in reassembling the data. An essential step with qualitative research and data analysis lies 
in the ability to uncover patterns as well as frequencies (Krenn, 2015; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). I used text analyzer to find the most frequent phrases as well as 
subjected the data to Microsoft Excel for the graphical depiction of words that most often 
occurred, and pie charts with which one can easily discern and interpret qualitative data.   
As with quantitative research, there are several computer software packages for 
qualitative research methods. Kornbluh (2015) identified the commonly used computer 
programmes for qualitative data analysis as QDA Miner Lite, Nvivo, ATLAS, 
MAXQDA, and Quirkos.  Researchers rely on qualitative data analysis to manage 
voluminous amounts of data, save time, and enhance the validity of qualitative research 
(Burnap et al., 2013). Consideration of the use of data analysis software including 
Information Technology (IT) software available for qualitative data analysis and 
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representation would be prudent. The merits for MAXQDA include the provision to 
support text, audios, and graphical files as well as its inherent capability to handle 
numerous coding, retrievals, and visualization (Franzosi, Doyle, MClelland, Putnam 
Rankin, & Vicari, 2013). I used MAXQDA for windows software. 
MAXQDA aided with the coding of each concept and the subsequent 
identification of emergent themes. Pierre and Jackson (2014) detailed that the critical 
facets of qualitative data analysis are the coding of data that serve the purpose of 
condensing the data to reasonable portions, coalescing the codes to broader themes and 
finally displaying or representing the data. A distinct advantage of MAXQDA is its 
ability to form themes from the various concepts and the graphical display in MS Excel 
or Word, of those concepts and codes, as they emerge through a plethora of data. These 
byproducts help in providing the essential building block that forms the basis for 
interpreting data.  
Interpreting data  
The use of a structured system of data analysis will guarantee an accurate 
interpretation and representation of data gathered to gain an understanding of the 
strategies insurance business leaders use for corporate governance to support financial 
performance. Pierre and Jackson (2014) described qualitative data analysis as the 
procedures that commence from data collection to the organization, explanation, and 
interpretation of the phenomenon of a research study. During the interpreting data stage, I 
used the reassembled data to form a narrative.  
There are several approaches used by researchers to analyze data, the style 
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incorporated often varies with the methods of qualitative design inquiry. Each qualitative 
research design calls for a different data analysis process. Yin (2013) stated that it is 
essential for a researcher to use the appropriate data analysis for each research design 
approach. For this multiple case study research, I used methodological triangulation to 
enhance the validity of my research. The combination of several data sources aids in 
achieving methodical triangulation (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). To do this, I used the 
information gathered from the interview, observation, audio recordings, and all the 
archival records. Qualitative research routinely incorporates member checks to solicit 
research participant insight on research findings (Modell, 2015; Wilson, 2014). I also 
reassembled the data and reviewed the process with emergent themes again to compare 
emergent themes as well as incorporate member checks as a compulsory part of my data 
analysis process. 
Conclusion making  
Before closing the data analysis process, I proceeded to the conclusion stage to 
systematic and meticulously compose a summary. Shekhar Singh, (2014) provided a 
comprehensive conclusion during the data analysis phrase after relating new research 
findings to the case study research of non-profit organization. In concluding the study, I 
highly considered data and information from the interpretive stage to draw a summary.  
I also gauged if patterns that emerge corroborate with the general writings of 
other authors and try to assess reasons for material deviations. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) advocated stepping back to consider what the analyzed data mean and evaluating 
their implications when making qualitative research conclusions. Within my summary, I 
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cross checked and compared my findings with those of previous studies in corporate 
governance of financial and the non-financial institutions to uncover any significant 
divergence, similarity, or overlap. In qualitative studies, the provision of data to rival 
findings is through the identification of an alternative or competing finding (Farrelly, 
2013; Yin, 2014). Hence, such a comparison would aid in enhancing the validity of my 
research. 
I documented all findings that resulted from the rival finding and assessed the 
emergent themes with the stipulations of the agency theory, which was the girding and 
framework lens for the literature review of my research study. The agency theory 
fulcrums on the assumption that managers are inclined to make decisions that would not 
maximize shareholder interest due to non-alignment of goals between the principal and 
the agent (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). Hence, in my summary I considered and 
weighed the critical elements of the conceptual framework of this research against each 
emergent theme, and corroborated recent research finding published since 2018 while my 
literature review was ongoing to uncover the strategies that ensure sound corporate 
governance in the insurance industry.  
Reliability and Validity  
Reliability 
Reliability and validity are critical determinants of effectiveness for any 
qualitative research study. In qualitative research, reliability is the assurance that multiple 
readers will provide a similar analysis of data as did the researcher. The most important 
standard of a research study are validity and reliability. Notwithstanding, the gauge for 
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validity and reliability differ for qualitative and quantitative research (Gheondea-Eladi, 
2014). Ali and Yusof (2011) defined reliability as the ability for a researcher to replicate 
a study that would yield similar results. Researchers strive to keep the research setting to 
a constant to enhance the chance that replication provides identical results.   
Unlike quantitative research where research instruments may easily be subjected 
to a test and retest to confirm reliability with the generation of a similar response, in 
qualitative research the consistent maintenance of the concept of reliability often presents 
with a challenge. The chance of attaining research reliability maybe hampered and is not 
always possible, such as when it is impractical to replicate the actual setting of data 
collection. Notwithstanding, there are several strategies can aid qualitative researchers in 
guaranteeing the trustworthiness of research findings which include, data triangulation, a 
demonstration of an unobstructed flow of thought in data collection and interpretation, 
and the engagement of a sound system for data storage and record keeping (Kornbluh, 
2015). I envisioned that a combination of these strategies would help enhance the 
reliability of this research study and provide a more comprehensive set of findings.  
I undertook several steps to assure my research. While going through the entire 
research process, I created a journal for documenting all the research steps and 
procedures systematically and logically. Appendix A contains the details of the interview 
protocol that guided me in ensuring that all the necessary steps for obtaining a robust and 
detailed data, essential for achieving the objectives of my research study. The receipt of 
feedback on an interview protocol enhances the reliability and the trustworthiness of a 
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research instrument (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). I received feedback from peers before the 
finalization of the interview protocol.   
In addition to the interview protocol, I created provisions for debriefings using 
external checks and retained all signed copies provided to me as evidence of the third 
party views, sentiments, and opinions. El Hussein, Jakubec, and Osuji (2015) said that 
with peer review, the peer, as well as the researcher, should each provide a document of 
their reports. Yin (2014) referred to coding by a third party as blind coding. I used 
information and communication gadgets to record findings accurately and transcribe data. 
The use of relevant MAXQDA computer programs and MS office packages to analyze 
and represent data assisted in assuring reliability.  
To safeguard the reliability of the findings, researchers need to examine 
dependability. Dependability is the extent by which findings are subject to change and 
uncertainty (Anney, 2014). Dependability is an essential quality in research findings. Yin 
(2013) defined dependability as the constancy with which research findings could be 
repeated and result in similar outcomes.  
I addressed dependability by maintaining an accurate record of all audio- tapes, 
documents, and kept precise details of the research steps with the guide of a research 
journal and an interview protocol. Gheondea-Eladi (2014) posited that the context of 
qualitative research is prone to constant changes, as a result it is prudent to document all 
features of changes should future researcher take an interest in replicating the results. 
Researchers use documentation in the confirmatory process to ascertain dependability 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011; Yin, 2014). The maintenance of 
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audio and written records provided an audit trail that I availed to the interview 
participants for future access for review of the themes generated from the data collection 
and analysis. 
Validity  
While using numerical indices and measures readily ascertain the validity of 
research findings, it may be a daunting task to determine in qualitative research, which 
revolves around human understanding. Business scholars have endorsed various 
terminologies and perspectives to infer the word qualitative validity as it is complicated 
to encapsulate the term to a single phrase in qualitative research (Anney, 2014). Scientific 
scholars are critical of qualitative research for failing to conform to the tenets of validity 
and reliability when carrying out experimental research (Gheondea-Eladi, 2014). The 
challenges of ascertaining validity in qualitative research and the divergent views by 
scholars are indications of how complex the term validity is in the contextual setting of 
qualitative research.  
There is a plethora of views and terms that scholars have created to signify the 
intent of validity. Elo et al. (2014) defined validity as accuracy or precision of a research 
finding. In qualitative research, the attainment of validity is by giving heed to the 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of research findings (Sarma, 
2015; Yin, 2013). I used a methodical structure in which these qualities were realizable in 
my research study and allowed for the test by external scrutiny.  
A qualitative researcher can use several methods to establish credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability and hence ascertain validity. Reliability 
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is the gauge for correctness or the truthfulness of research data and findings (Sarma, 
2015). Credibility is about the believability and trustworthiness of research findings 
(Bennett & McWhorter, 2016). I used triangulation of data sources to guarantee 
credibility. Corroborating multiple data sources such as the accounts of third parties 
support credibility (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). I used peer review, established, and 
followed the interview protocol in a systematic order, to enhance the credibility of my 
research. Farrelly (2013) theorized that the use of investigators, other third parties, and 
the choice of spending additional time in a field location to gather information bolsters 
research credibility. The actions targeting credibility assures that a researcher is 
addressing the findings from the perspective of the participants.   
Transferability is the ability by which the findings of qualitative research are 
generalizable. McInnes, Peters, Bonney, and Halcomb (2017) defined transferability as 
the extent to which elements in a naturalistic study can extrapolate to other settings. To 
enhance on transferability, I adequately provided with a comprehensive description of the 
process, limitations, and assumptions of my research to aid readers to evaluate whether 
appropriate generalizations is possible to other contexts.  
Researchers carry their own biases to a study. Hence, a research finding has the 
potential for bias. Confirmability in a qualitative research study is the extent to which the 
results and research are without the effect of a researcher’s bias (Fusch & Ness, 2015). I 
used multiple validation strategies that include peer reviews and methodical triangulation 
to assure confirmability by using numerous data sources. When external reviewers 
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examined and corroborated the data substantiating my findings it resulted in an 
assumption that no biases influenced the data collection and analysis. 
Data Saturation  
Failure to attain data saturation affects the quality of research by curtailing its 
validity. O’Reilly and Parker (2012) stated that data saturation occurred when there were 
no new elements of discussion from interviewees concerning a research question. Fusch 
and Ness (2015) recommended a sample size of 10 for a multiple qualitative research 
case study. I planned to advance with interviewing the seven participants again, if there 
was no attainment of data saturation after the initial seven interviews, to a point when no 
additional themes emerge. I documented the level and position at which data saturation 
occurred and described the manner in which I was able to assert the attainment of data 
saturation for my research study.  
I documented a plan for the process of the contemplation of data to challenge my 
research findings prior to the data collection phase. In quantitative studies, the statistical 
estimates act as the gauge for extrapolating data finding (Yin, 2014). However, for 
qualitative studies, the yardstick to gauge and challenge data findings may only be 
achieved through the identification of an alternative or rival finding (Farrelly, 2013; Yin, 
2014). I used the process of an alternative rival finding, which is similar to a method of 
elimination, to ascertain data saturation, where each additional contrary finding lent 
credence, and strengthened the findings of my research study.  
In accordance with the interview protocol, I carried out a pilot test to ensure that I 
posed the right questions during the interview process. Sarma (2015) advocated that that 
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pilot testing might assist in the refinement of the interview questions. Pilot testing aids in 
safeguarding that the interview questions are appropriate and fit within the time allotted 
for an interview.  
The formulation of a unit of study may appear daunting for research but when 
well-framed supports data validity. Hence, formulating proper definitions of a case study 
and bounding helps to mitigate the potential challenge with data formulation (Yin, 2014). 
The action of establishing a unit of study aids in ring-fencing or setting boundaries by 
defining the possible extent of any study without the risk of data saturation. I made a 
concise formulation of the unit of my research study and used the bonding process by 
setting an appropriate context and hence narrowed my research to a manageable size as 
the topic of corporate governance is complex and broad. 
Transition and Summary 
In this section, I deliberated on the purpose of this qualitative multiple case study, 
which explored the strategies insurance business leaders, use for corporate governance to 
support financial performance. In section 2, I incorporated a discussion on the research 
methods and research design and provided information on the key determinants of 
population sampling, and the alignment with the stipulations of ethical research and the 
IRB requirements. In this section, I also included a discussion on the instruments, and 
techniques in use for the collection, organization, and analysis of data. I established the 
achievement of reliability and validity for this research. 
In Section 3, I presented the findings and results of this study and included a 
discussion of the application to professional practice, the implication for social change, 
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recommendation for action and further research, as well as a consideration of my 










Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the corporate 
governance strategies insurance business leaders use to support financial performance. 
The targeted population consisted of business leaders from seven insurance companies in 
the corporate sector in Austria who have used corporate governance strategies to support 
financial performance.  The findings revealed that successful insurance business owners 
relied on a robust system for risk management, used an effective method of internal 
control for sound governance, and consistently applied and complied with corporate 
governance principles and regulations.  
Presentation of the Findings 
I conducted semistructured interviews and collected annual financial reports from 
business leaders from seven insurance companies in the corporate sector in Austria to 
respond to the following central research question: What strategies do some insurance 
business leaders use for corporate governance to support financial performance? I 
reviewed online archival materials regarding corporate governance for each of the seven 
insurance companies and carried out a thorough study of peer-reviewed journals which 
served as the foundation to link my research question to the conceptual framework. 
The sample for this multiple case study consisted of seven business leaders from 
seven insurance companies who have been continually successful in implementing 
governance strategies that support sound governance. The participants were senior 
insurance leaders and all possessed over 17 years of experience in the sector. I continued 
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to interview the participants until I was confident that I had reached data saturation. Each 
participant responded to seven open-ended interview questions. The interview time 
varied, with an average time of an hour and 10 minutes. I used pseudonyms (e.g., P1, P2, 
P3.) to preserve the confidentiality of each participant, while also ensuring no disclosure 
of company details in any of the collection materials.  
I recorded the responses to the semistructured interviews and revisited the 
responses by listening to the recordings. I provided each interview participant with a copy 
of the transcript of each interview, including a summary of the findings and conclusions 
from the study. Harvey (2015) specified that the provision of summary transcriptions to 
participants allows for member-checking and enhances the validity and credibility of 
data. I used the process of triangulation to ensure the validity and reliability of data by 
gathering archival documents that included published financial statements to supplement 
the primary data collection of this study. I commenced with the organization of data by 
transcribing, cleaning, and labeling the data. I replayed audio recordings on my laptop 
and the digital recording on a smartphone to safeguard the accuracy of the transcribed 
data. I reviewed the responses of each participant for each of the seven questions 
separately and coded the responses for recurring themes using MAXQDA.  
Next, I conducted another analysis using the total of participant responses 
grouped for each question. The analysis of data indicated 93 coded statements and 11 




Responses by Participants to Interview Questions 
Excerpts responses from participants Interpretation and analysis Emergent subthemes  
Interview Question 1: What are the 
strategies used to link strategic 
corporate governance and the 
internal control systems (ICS) 
within your organization? P2: "We 
have a team of executives who are 
conversant with the corporate 
governance requirements as 
stipulated by the Austrian codes of 
corporate governance." P7: "By 
crafting policies that set the 
minimum requirements for BOD, 
especially for the supervisory board 
membership." 
An analysis of the 
responses from the 
participants indicate on 
the essential role of 
ensuring that board 
members possess the 
appropriate qualification 
Qualification of Board members 
Interview Question 2: What 
strategies were used to ensure that 
sound corporate governance leads to 
improved financial performance? 
P1: "The senior management of our 
organization has opted to comply 
with the voluntary regulations as the 
Austrian codes of governance by 
offering to comply with the 
requirements of the codes than 
opting to explain." P3: "Providing 
CEOs and our managers and senior 
staff with remuneration incentive 
that encourage and reward excellent 
financial performance for our 
shareholders and business clients 
including the community where we 
operate". P4: "with objectives that 
aid in complying with the codes and 
the annual risk reporting per 
Solvency II.  
An analysis of the 
responses from the 
participants indicate on 
the role of risk reporting 
as per the governance 
principles and on the 
requirements of Solvency 
II as well as the 
significance of complying 
with the codes of 
corporate governance   
Solvency II                                                            
Risk reporting                                                      




The 11 unique codes represented the main sub-themes that morphed from my 
study. Consequently, the major themes that emerged after several iterative processes of 
compiling, disassembling, and reassembling data with MAXQDA were (a) a robust 
system for risk management, (b) a system of internal control for sound governance, and 
(c) the consistent application of and compliance with corporate governance principles and 
regulations. I have presented each thematic finding in greater detail.  
Theme 1: A Robust System for Risk Management  
 The first theme was the importance of possessing a robust system for risk 
management. The participants’ responses emphasized the essential need for a robust 
system for risk management. The coded frequencies of Theme 1 with its corresponding 
subthemes and the percentages of occurrences in participants’ responses for each 
subtheme appear in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Emergent Theme 1: Risk Management 
Subthemes n P1-P2 P3-P4 P5-P7 
ERM system 13 30 40 30 
Comprehensive risk 12 20 35 45 
A risk management framework 15 30 20 50 
Note. n = Occurrences. P1-P7 represents percentage of occurrences in participants’ 
responses rounded to whole numbers. 
All the participants reported to me regarding the marked steps that have been put 
in place to guarantee a comprehensive risk management system. The participants 
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informed me that a CEO and directors within an insurance company must consistently 
give attention to risk management to ensure sound corporate governance. Risk 
management involves all the organizational procedures that companies use to identify, 
control, and mitigate risk (Zuckweiler et al., 2016). P4 stated that, “a proper risk 
management framework is an essential requirement and we work to confirm that it’s 
operational at critical level, all the times.” P3 stressed the importance of monitoring and 
reviewing the risk management framework to align it with the ever-changing realities of 
the insurance industry.  
The risk management framework is essential in the assessment and management 
of risk, which aids in the selection and specification of appropriate organizational control. 
Thomas and Xu (2018) defined a risk management framework as the overarching 
organizational architectural structure which allows for a structured and coherent way of 
determining, controlling, and managing risk. P3 and P4 noted that firmly enshrining risk 
management needs within the business strategy aids in achieving optimal results toward 
sound governance in the insurance industry. P1 indicated that, “the enterprise risk 
management (ERM) is a comprehensive tool with which risk is effectively managed in 
our company.” Kim and Yoo (2017) defined ERM as the definitive strategy by a business 
to plan, identify, control, and mitigate risks that would adversely interfere with the 
operations and objectives of a company as well as the identification of any resultant 
opportunities. The findings from my data analysis align with the views of Cheffins (2015) 
who observed that a lack of ERM created room for misconduct to thrive. With ERM, 
business leaders can help ensure that organizational risk remains within manageable 
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levels without exceeding the organizationally predefined levels of acceptable risk and 
uncertainty. 
An ERM system includes the procedures that organizations use to manage risk. 
Kim and Yoo (2017) stated that ERM procedures limited agency costs and recommended 
the use of ERM to enhance corporate governance practices within business companies. 
P2 and P5 informed me that an effective ERM facilitated advance information sharing on 
risk elements that provide managers with a warning on ways to avoid or mitigate risk. All 
participants in this study underscored the relevance of having an effective ERM system 
that is flexible and adaptable to the dynamics of the modern insurance industry.  
Agency costs occur when an agent acts on behalf of a principal. Feil et al. (2018) 
defined agency costs as the provisions of firms’ contract that aids in aligning the actions 
of managers with the interest of the shareholder. Agency theory hinges on the notion of 
misalignment between the interest of shareholder and management as the genesis of poor 
governance. Dawar (2014) underscored the mismatch in interest between the 
shareholders and executives as the crux of misconduct. All the participants elaborated in 
this study how enshrining an elaborate system of risk management created a system that 
enabled an appropriate identification and classification of risk with clarity on the staff 
responsible for managing risk. The proper management of risk results in the reduction of 
the negative impact of risk and ultimately the preservation of business earnings and the 
shareholder value.  
Strategic risk management is a critical determinant in the way that companies will 
define and execute their current and long-term objectives. All the participants’ views 
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aligned with that of Timothy and Ard-Pieter (2018) who stressed the linkages between 
business strategy and strategic risk management. P6 informed me about the consistent 
efforts of his company to streamline and weave risk management strategies together with 
annual efforts by the CEO and senior management in designing an overarching strategy. 
Zungu et al. (2018) conducted a study on ERM and strategy formulation by making 
comparisons using the traditional risk management procedures and concluded that firms 
that included risk formulation during strategy setting were more successful in mitigating 
corporate risk. Such companies stood to benefit from a system that girds against 
potentially unfavorable risk events that may lower company profitability and earnings 
and thereby reduce shareholder value. 
The participants underscored on the pivotal role of a robust risk management 
framework in enhancing financial performance. The essential part of risk management as 
a defining factor aligns with the views in my literature review that were highlighted by 
Nahar et al. (2016) and Lenssen et al. (2014). P1, P4, P5, and P7 repeatedly mentioned 
the improved financial performance as a tangible benefit that results from the consistent 
and appropriate application of risk management procedures. Annamalah et al. (2018) 
discovered a correlation between risk management and business performance. P1, P3, and 
P6 provided examples of how their insurance companies made marked improvements in 
financial performance that was evidenced through higher earnings when they initially 
implemented an overarching risk management system. P5 and P6 warned that insurance 
businesses in the 21st century face challenges that include global competition from within 
the insurance industry, emerge from other complex systems, deregulation, and political 
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risk. Senior management need to continually ensure that their risk management system is 
sufficiently robust to anticipate and implement risk strategies that mitigate risk and most 
importantly present with concrete information on how businesses can exploit global 
market changes to their advantage.  
The central business proposition of all insurance companies regardless of sector 
centers on risk. Buallay et al. (2017) specified that corporate governance and firm 
performance are intimately entwined and stated that risk management as an essential 
element of sound corporate governance that managers need to actively implement to 
assure a comprehensive system of control and governance. Sinha and Arena (2018) 
advocated for the promotion of internal control features that are specific to audit that 
advanced risk awareness and sensitization through employee empowerment and training. 
Maintaining a corporate culture that allows a robust system of risk management to thrive 
is essential for the survival and enhances business performance within the insurance 
industry.  
Theme 2: A System of Internal Control for Sound Governance 
An effective internal control system is essential in guarding against financial loss 
and ensuring that executives accomplish their strategic objective. Participant P2, P3, P5, 
and P7 stated how crucial it is to link strategic goals with the system of internal control. 
P2 and P4 specified that an internal control system and governance mechanism designed 
in isolation has the potential to create gaps and losses in operations which would 
undoubtedly be detrimental to the insurance industry. The coded frequencies of Theme 2 
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with its corresponding subthemes and the percentages of occurrences in participants’ 
responses for each subtheme appear in Table 3. 
The participants emphasized to me the importance of having board members that 
were suitably qualified and independent. The view on the possession of appropriate 
qualifications align with those of White et al. (2015) and Bernard et al. (2018) who 
highlighted the experience and qualification of the board of directors. P2, P5, and P7 
stressed on the importance of a functional Board of directors who can adequately define a 
governance structure with internal organizational structures that assure proper control and 
oversight which match with the OECD (2017) guidelines on insurers governance on the 
stipulations for the composition and the diversity of boards. P3, P6, and P7 indicated the 
way in which the organization routinely evaluates the board to ensure that they fulfill the 
requirements listed and approved in the organizational internal control framework. 
Table 3 
Emergent Theme 2: Internal Control Mechanism 
Subthemes  N P1-P2 P3-P4 P5-P7 
Qualified board members 12 20 40 40 
Controls with stakeholder interest 15 20 30 50 
Effective governance tools 11 30 30 40 
Reforms on control framework 13 25 30 45 
Note. n = Occurrences. P1-P7 represents percentage of occurrences in participants 
responses rounded to whole numbers 
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The participants informed me that the business leaders in the insurance industry 
must define and implement a system of internal control and governance that would help 
attain the ultimate goal of profitability for the business. All participants in this study 
underscored to me the need for the CEO's involvement in ensuring that the system of 
internal control is owned and promoted by staff and for the benefit of all stakeholders of 
an insurance company. Maxfield et al. (2018) noted an increasing awareness and 
compliance with the internal control and governance structures after the 2010 financial 
crisis but cautioned that majority of the reforms on the internal control framework 
continue to correspond and give preeminence to the interest of the shareholder. The 
reforms on the internal control framework and governance conform to the central premise 
of the agency theory which maintains the shareholder interest at its core. Maxfield et al. 
evidenced through their study that internal control reforms that are agency-theory driven 
center on maximizing shareholder interest and hence continue to be laden with the 
demerits of the agency theory where little consideration goes to the benefit of other 
stakeholders which creates the potential for financial misconduct and scandals.  The 
internal control system must align with the company strategy and give full heed to the 
interests of all stakeholders. 
All the participants in their response to the question of linkages of internal control 
and corporate governance specified that success in their insurance businesses considers 
an effective governance structure and an internal control framework as one that is tailored 
to create value for all stakeholders. P4 stressed that, “the insurance industry has become 
very competitive and complex and it would be imprudent for our company to possess an 
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internal control framework that purely sought after maximizing the shareholder interest 
by focusing attention solely on corporate earnings”.  The views on the consideration of 
the interest of other stakeholder align with the stakeholder theory. Hussain et al. (2018) 
stated that with the stakeholder theory businesses consider the managerial, financial and 
socio-environmental objectives. Barker and Chiu (2018) recommended stakeholder value 
creation as an ideal requirement for corporate success. Unlike the agency theory that is 
primarily about the maximization of shareholder interest, with the stakeholder theory 
business leaders are focused on the creation of value for all stakeholders.  
Bernard et al. (2018) highlighted on the effect of CEO performance and company 
performance with specific emphasis on corporate sustainability and recommended an 
internal control framework that considered the essential role played by external 
stakeholders. While there are several instances that link corporate governance with 
corporate social responsibility which in turn promote a positive corporate image and 
confidence within the general population, Crifo, Escrig-Olmedo, and Mottis (2018) 
undertook a study that indicated that corporate governance might possess an ambiguous 
role in corporate sustainability depending on the composition and type of the Board of 
Directors. The fashion in which a company positions its corporate strategy has a direct 
bearing on its relationship with its stakeholders and often demarcates the extent to which 
its corporate social responsibility can transcend. Additionally, in alignment with theme 1, 
it is essential for business leaders to consider the qualification and composition of the 
board as it would have a significant bearing on a company's internal control framework 
as regards corporate sustainability. 
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To improve business performance in the insurance industry and thereby enhance 
financial performance, business leaders must make every effort to design an 
organizational architecture with an overarching strategy that would implement a robust 
internal control system and governance mechanism that creates value for all the 
stakeholders within an organization. An internal control mechanism that only considers 
value creation for the shareholder will likely reduce agency costs but not provide the 
insurance companies with the strong girds required to be profitable and remain 
sustainable in the long term. Barker and Chiu (2018) recommended stakeholder value 
creation as a prerequisite for corporate innovation and success. Unlike the agency theory 
that grounded this study, an integration of all stakeholder interest that gives due 
consideration to corporate social responsibility, as well as corporate sustainability 
imperatives, is vital as propagated by the stakeholder theory. 
Theme 3: Consistent Application and Compliance with Corporate Governance 
Principles and Regulations  
Corporate governance in the insurance industry has been gaining significant 
attention and increasing focus by government and compliance regulators. All the 
participants pointed out that compliance is a vital component of corporate governance. 
The coded frequencies of Theme 3 with its corresponding subthemes and the percentages 
of occurrences in participants’ responses for each subtheme appear in Table 4.  
Compliance is the procedure that safeguards that companies abide by rules, 
standards and remain ethical in their dealings (Buallay et al., 2017; Nakpodia et al, 2018). 
P4 and P6 informed me that there had been many regulatory issues and amendments to 
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the existing governance framework in Austria. P2, P4, and P7 noted that the corporate 
governance compliance framework for the insurance industry especially companies listed 
on the ABS was comprehensive and very elaborate. P5 informed me that there are 
suitable Information Technology (IT) soft wares that can effectively implement and offer 
support in the implementation of regulatory procedures within the insurance business.  
The participants spoke in detail of the need for consistency in the compliance and 
application of governance regulations. P5 and P6 stated that corporate governance 
compliance has two main approaches, the rule, and principle-based approach. Elshandidy 
et al. (2018) noted that the mandatory and voluntary corporate compliance measures 
should be viewed in close association as they possess the potential to complement each 
other. The complementary viewpoint augurs well with the recommendations by Nakpodia 
et al. (2018) for an integrated system that consolidates the components of the rule and 
principle directives. Both the voluntary and mandatory compliance types need to be 
viewed jointly whenever possible and not in complete isolation. 
Table 4 
Emergent Theme 3: Corporate Governance Principles 
Governance principles N P1-P2 P3-P4 P5-P7 
Adherance to Solvency II 23 30 25 45 
Codes of Corporate Governance 18 15 30 55 
Explain or Comply principle 17 20 35 45 
Risk report on governance stipulation 15 30 40 30 
Note. n = Occurrences. P1-P7 represents percentage of occurrences in participants 
responses rounded to whole numbers 
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 All participants informed me of the stringent procedure that is in place to 
safeguard the compliance with mandatory legislation on corporate governance. P2, P3, 
and P7 highlighted on the specific management procedures that were established to 
update their business strategy to align with the additional measures enacted by the 
Austrian legislator to enhance the responsibility of the supervisory board. In Austria, The 
Netherlands, and Germany the governance structure for listed companies consists of a 
two-tier system with the supervisory board and the management board. The management 
board is responsible for the general direction while the supervisory board is accountable 
for the material business decision. Rabóczki (2018) indicated that the role of the 
supervisory was instrumental and it was established to oversee the decisions of the 
management board on behalf of other stakeholders. The two-tier governance structure is 
in greater alignment with the stakeholder theory as opposed to the agency theory, which 
grounded my study. 
All participants emphasized to me on the manner that unswerving compliance 
with Solvency II, a regulatory ruling in 2016 by the European Union (The European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) that govern the way in which the 
insurance business is financed and regulated, has enhanced governance by the 
supervisory board. The views on consistency in compliance align with those in my 
literature review by Cardone-Riportella and García-Mandaloniz (2017) who stated that 
the Solvency II was created to bring about positive change and to create an effective 
supervisory system to curtail financial crisis within the insurance industry. Solvency II, 
which is composed of three primary pillars, considers a risk-based methodology (E-
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Vahdati et al, 2018). Participant P3 indicated that, “the requirements for Solvency II are 
rigorous but beneficial to our company and its stakeholders”. P1 and P5 indicated that 
full compliance with Solvency II ensure that their companies consider all elements and 
types of risk and has created more transparency and appropriate disclosure of all risks on 
the financial statement. Such disclosures are essential in aiding insurance companies in 
providing solid options on the ways to manage uncertainty and mitigate risk. P1, P4, and 
P6 cautioned that though beneficial, relatively smaller insurance companies may find 
cumbersome the financial modeling regulations imposed by Solvency II that is essential 
in computing the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). An excerpt from one of the 
participants that has the information on the comprehensive allocation of major risk as 
reported in Solvency II disclosure (YE) 2017 is located in Appendix B.  
The participants informed me that the mandatory compliance reporting for the 
insurance companies continues to evolve as regulatory authorities incorporate new 
operational realities of the insurance industry. P2 and P4 specified that sometimes the 
task of comprehending a new complex regulation is arduous requiring specialist 
knowledge in financial modeling, actuarial sciences, or insurance law. Elshandidy et al. 
(2018) recommended that the merits of the regulations often outweigh their costs. 
Hussain et al. (2018) observed that regulatory authorities usually provide a transitionary 
period to allow companies to implement new regulations to aid in smoothening 
operations and lower disruptive potential to business. P2 noted that, “compliance with 
most regulation including Solvency II incorporated a transitionary period which has 
given us ample time to implement its rigorous requirements. I would have been difficult 
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to implement Solvency II without this grace period”. One can construe that initial 
compliance with the regulation is indicative of senior managements' resolve and 
unflinching commitment toward corporate governance. 
All the participants informed me that the majority of the compliance requirement 
for corporate governance revolved around reporting and disclosure requirements. 
Elshandidy et al. (2018) underscored that risk reporting was relevant to the corporate 
governance of insurance companies. P6 and P7 informed me that the reporting and other 
compliance-related reporting for the insurance industry has evolved and become 
increasingly stringent especially since the recent spate of the global financial crisis that 
plagued the insurance industry. The views on rigorous reporting and compliance do not 
align with those in my literature review by Woo et al. (2015) who observed that the 
insurance sector has a more lenient framework for governance than the banking industry.  
P4 and P6 narrated how their companies continually abide by the reporting requirements 
and how such compliance has served to maintain credibility and consumer confidence. 
The presumption that the non-financial sector, of which the insurance company 
comprises, has a less stringent corporate governance framework than the banking sector 
may not hold true due to the rise in nature and scope of new corporate governance 
regulation increasingly imposed on the insurance sector. 
The participants specified that the amendment in 2015 of the Austrian codes of 
corporate governance provided a governance framework that increases transparency and 
accountability to all stakeholders. The participants mentioned how they had implemented 
the requirements of these codes by either complying or offering an explanation for non-
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compliance. The corporate code of governance is a legal framework that is non-binding 
although companies listed on the ABS must fully comply with its requirements 
(Schuchter & Levi, 2016). P1, P3, and P7 acknowledged that compliance with the codes 
together with the implementation of a comprehensive risk management procedure has 
wrought on benefits which aid all stakeholders besides potential investors in assessing 
corporate performance. P1 also highlighted how it has complied with voluntary 
regulations as the Austrian codes of governance by offering to comply with the 
requirements of the codes than opting to explain, as it was in the interest of all 
stakeholders. However, the participants informed me of the consolidated implementation 
of the codes with other governance measures to enhance performance which would not 
be attained purely by implementing the codes. The complementary viewpoint of applying 
the codes of governance as part of a comprehensive governance structure resonates with 
the recommendation in my literature review by Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016), Yeoh 
(2016) and Bester (2015) who underscored that the code of corporate governance was 
inadequate alone. The evidence implies that there is no single solution for sound 
governance. 
In summary, unlike the agency theory that grounded this study, the results of my 
data indicate the importance of implanting the codes of corporate governance which 
addresses the need of all stakeholders, contrary to the agency theory but in alignment 
with the stakeholder theory. The evidence indicates that corporate compliance with the 
codes alone is not sufficient and that a comprehensive strategy that incorporates other 




Applications to Professional Practice 
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore the strategies insurance 
business leaders use for corporate governance to support financial performance. A 
successful and profitable insurance environment is beneficial to society as it promotes 
risk control activity and boosts the public and investor confidence. Choi et al. (2018) 
stated that the practice of good governance promotes firm credibility and financial 
performance. A successful insurance company is beneficial in reducing the overall risk 
exposure and provides the potential for a safe environment that is conducive to higher 
investments opportunities and a higher financial earning potential. 
The findings of this study are essential to the professional business practice in 
many ways. As indicated by the participants a robust system of risk management is 
necessary for enhancing stability and corporate success. Insurance business leaders could 
consider embedding risk management in its totality to their organizations. Strategic risk 
management is a critical factor in determining the manner in which companies execute 
their current and long-term objectives (Saggar & Singh, 2017).  An ERM would benefit 
insurances companies in the identification, assessment, and management of risk as well 
as the maximization of business opportunities. As informed by P2, P5, and P7 
implementing a risk management system and consolidating risk management and 
reporting may be achieved with senior management commitment and involvement 
through strategic planning and objective setting. The use of a risk management 
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framework would be essential in ensuring that staff members with defined roles use 
established, iterative processes, and risk reporting tools to assess and control risk. 
My data findings and recommendations could comprise solutions of possible 
enhancements in strategies that insurance business leaders need to eliminate 
noncompliance with corporate governance practices and improve financial performance. 
CEOs must underscore the importance and give full heed to the corporate governance 
principles and regulations, as well as enshrine their requirements to corporate strategy 
during strategy formulation by senior management, with full participation of staff. 
Wanyama and Olweny (2013) indicated that the benefits of implementing and complying 
with corporate governance standards include an increase in trust and a reduction in the 
cost of capital. Choi et al. (2018) specified that the implementation of corporate 
governance principles might be tedious at the onset, but the benefits that derive from its 
application are tangible and far-reaching. As per the findings of this study, it is beneficial 
for insurance companies to commence the process of full compliance with the 
stipulations and principles of corporate governance by designating suitably qualified legal 
and financial staff to map out the consolidation of each element to the organizational 
framework of rules and procedures.  Equally, I would recommend training for senior 
management staff so as to ensure that they understand and appreciate the requirements as 
well as obtain knowhow on how to optimize the implementation of corporate governance 
principles. From the data findings of this study, to help navigate through the increasingly 
complex regulatory framework of corporate governance, business leaders in the insurance 
industry may make use of information technology software to assist with the 
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implementation of corporate governance principles and regulation. For instance, Matrix 
Laboratory (MATLAB) may be used to improve the mathematical models of governance 
that are prescribed by Solvency II. 
The consistent application and compliance with corporate governance principles 
would increase transparency and accountability in the insurance industry. Besides, it has 
a positive impact on earning and would raise the share price on insurance shares. 
Schuchter and Levi (2016) stated that the benefits of the codes of corporate governance 
include greater accountability and a high propensity for ethical behavior. Compliance 
with corporate governance principles ensures that other stakeholder interests are 
recognized and safeguarded. Prokhorova and Zakharova (2016) and Yeoh (2016) 
emphasized that a governance mechanism must be comprehensive enough with complete 
regard for all stakeholders to guarantee corporate success. Ribe et al (2018) described the 
use of the stakeholder theory by management as a symbiotic association for corporate 
sustainability. With my study research, I may contribute to the necessity for corporate 
executives in the insurance business to seek a holistic management mechanism to impact 
corporate value through value creation for all the stakeholders. A holistic management 
mechanism occurs when senior business leaders consistently apply and comply with 
corporate governance principles.  
Implications for Social Change 
The findings of this study may have a positive social impact in myriad ways. The 
consistent application and compliance with corporate governance principles and 
regulations by the insurance industry may create stability in the insurance industry and 
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bolster public confidence. Thomas and Xu (2018) specified that weak corporate policy 
results from a lack of stringent governance principles. The global financial scandals have 
increased since 2010, which has created business disruptions and occasioned losses for 
investors and the general public. An insurance industry with a robust risk management 
system results in the enhancement of transparency and abidance by the requirements of 
the corporate governance principles which safeguard the interest of all stakeholders.  A 
method of internal control for sound governance results in a culture of openness and 
transparency and policies that are in the best benefit of the shareholder where business 
leaders make decisions which would positively impact on corporate earnings. 
The observance of ethical practices and sound governance would cause CEOs to 
implement policies aimed toward value creation for the stakeholders. The implementation 
of value creation policies may result in an insurance industry that offers insurance 
products that create value for stakeholders, consider, and abide by the principles of 
corporate sustainability all which lead to responsible businesses. Barker and Chiu (2018) 
argued for the incorporation of corporate governance principles as they provided value 
for investors without solely seeking value for the investor. An insurance industry that 
creates value through observance of risk management, complies with good governance 
principles, and implements a system of internal control that may beneficially affect social 
change and is likely to create a business environment with better access to insurance for 
the community, stable employment opportunities, and the restoration of confidence in the 
insurance investment portfolios.  
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Recommendations for Action 
This study may offer essential policy strategies as well as implications that may 
aid insurance business leaders in the design and implementation of an organization 
architecture that is fully cognizant, implements and complies with risk management, 
internal control, and corporate governance principles. The CEOs and the corporate 
insurance directors have a pivotal role to play in enacting strategies that define the course 
of the insurance industry. Ali Reza and Amir (2018) in examining CEO and senior 
management compensation specified that business leaders establish the strategic direction 
and are responsible for securing the policies geared toward business success. Business 
leaders are an essential link who would effect change and who may pay attention to the 
results of this study to bring about positive change to the insurance industry. 
The insurance business leaders may consider incorporating the emergent themes 
from this study in designing their company strategies. A business strategy is the means by 
which companies develop a thorough methodology and a detailed plan of its prerequisite 
for success (Umar et al, 2018). I would recommend that the CEO and the directors amend 
their organizational architecture to safeguard that the business strategy that derives from 
it incorporates each of the three themes identified in this study.  
Specifically, I would recommend the implementation of an ERM system which 
would lead to the existence of a comprehensive risk management system. To establish an 
ERM, the CEO and the directors would need to design a risk management framework 
that strategically builds all the risk elements in one place. The consolidation of all 
significant risk in a central location may practically is attained by identifying all the 
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substantial risks and uncertainties which may be disruptive to an insurance organization. 
A risk map may be used to assess the probability and the magnitude of risk, which would 
be followed by a procedure that carefully crafts mitigating measure for the proper 
management of risk and the maximization thereof of all plausible opportunities.  A 
strategic risk management system is essential and a primary determinant of the fashion in 
which companies execute their objectives (Saggar & Singh, 2017). An ERM is highly 
recommended as it provides the insurance industry with the chance to reduce disruptive 
element that would impede business objectives and offer an opportunity for the delivery 
of positive business performance. 
I would recommend the implementation of an effective internal control system 
which would create stakeholder value and safeguard against financial loss. A stable 
internal control system has the potential to gird against the pitfalls that led to the rise in 
the spate of global corporate scandal. To successfully establish an adequate internal 
control mechanism, I recommend that the CEO and corporate directors make an 
appropriate linkage between the strategic objectives of the organization with the system 
of internal control. An arbitrary set of internal controls is weak from the onset and is 
guaranteed to not protect a company's earnings in a highly volatile and competitive 
business environment (Waweru, 2014). I would recommend the services of a reputable 
management consulting company for insurance organizations that are not well versed in 
comprehensive risk mapping and assessment, to provide training and assistance with the 
implementation of internal control framework that aligns insurance companies' control 
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with the OECD (2017) guidelines that ensure the principles on qualification, composition 
and the diversity of board members. 
I would recommend for the CEO and corporate director involvement in ensuring 
the consistent application and compliance with corporate governance principles and 
regulation. I would recommend the purchase of software for mathematical modeling used 
to improve the mathematical models of governance for corporate governance to help in 
computing the SCR. I would recommend the implementation of the corporate governance 
principles for all major insurance companies as opposed to the option to explain, that is 
optional for companies in the explain-or-comply governance principles. The explain-or-
comply principle offers valuable information as to the genuineness of board members’ 
commitment (Stanciu & Bran, 2018). I would also recommend that the consistent 
application and compliance with corporate governance principles and regulation is owned 
and promoted by staff and for the benefit of all stakeholders of an insurance organization. 
To attain this, the CEO may need to involve all staff in the understanding of the need for 
the governance structures and work with the directors to implement a change mechanism 
that would achieve the buy-in of all stakeholders where the shareholders comprehend and 
are appreciative of the need for sound corporate governance. Considering the 
requirements for all stakeholders promotes value creation for stakeholders and would 
beneficially affect social change.  
I hope that the results of this study may provide the insurance business leaders 
with the strategies for corporate governance to support financial performance. This study 
will also be beneficial to insurance company employees, the regulators of corporate 
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governance principles, and the central community of stakeholders within the insurance 
industry. My family, research study participants, and my recent residency one cohort of 
students with whom I was fortunate to liaise would also receive a copy. Without 
breaching any confidentiality rules, I plan to disseminate a summary of the study to my 
colleagues at work. At a later stage, I plan to co-publish a review of my research in a 
scholarly journal and seek for opportunities to present at suitable financial professional 
conferences at my work place. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The focus of this study was on the strategies that insurance business leaders use 
for corporate governance to support financial performance. The targeted population 
consisted of a business leader from seven insurance companies in the corporate sector in 
Austria who have used corporate governance strategies to support financial performance. 
Conducting an interview of insurance business leaders who have endured corporate 
hardship or an insurmountable amount of disruptive pressure from the insurance industry 
and still managed to maintain success may be essential to better understand and 
appreciate the essence of success amidst a highly competitive industry. Future research 
may also consider the extent to which the code of corporate governance established by 
the ABS, the OECD (2017) guidelines, and Solvency II created in 2016 by the regulators 
within the European insurance industry converge and overlap to understand if there 
would be a need to consolidate their requirements to simplify the regulatory elements 
within the insurance industry.  
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The primary limitation of this study is its confinement to the realm of the 
insurance industry, and the participants were from the financial insurance services. 
Marshall and Rossman (2016) specified that limitations are boundaries beyond the 
periphery of the research study. The findings and deductions of this study may not be 
relevant and applicable to other industrial sectors. I would recommend the study research 
to unravel the sound corporate governance practices in other industries. The second 
limitation was the case study participants’ provision of information captions of their 
perceptions of corporate governance for each case study. Marshall and Rossman (2016) 
indicated that in qualitative research, the onus of transferability rests with other 
researchers or readers in determining whether research findings are applicable from a 
study to another context. I would recommend the exercise of caution to other researchers 
in the possible application of my research findings to another setting. 
Reflections 
I chose to approach this study with an open mind and a fervent desire to unravel 
the reason and solution why corporate governance continues to mire the insurance 
industry. Corporate governance is a topic about which I have a keen interest and 
consistently kept abreast with on significant developments regardless of the industry. As I 
have read and acquainted with new issues that have come to surface on the topic of 
governance, I have discovered that my interest levels have also heightened as I have 
gleaned and absorbed new insights. 
I could have been biased because of the facts that have been presented in the news 
and on social media that global businesses would always have the propensity for failures 
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in as far as they enact the policies and practices on behalf of the shareholder, to whom 
they are accountable. I reasoned that such policies would only ever benefit the 
shareholders. Chikweche and Flatcher (2012) specified that it is essential to be 
profoundly aware of biases that may render partial the opinion of a researcher. I made 
every effort to design statements that would yield the best potential in obtaining objective 
feedback from each of the seven interview participants. I avoided research bias in the 
collection and analysis of the data emanating from this study by reviewing the participant 
responses with each participant to make sure that my transcribing was indeed objective. I 
also used the same question for each interview and was heavily reliant on the interview 
protocol. After completing the research study, I have been better informed especially 
after conducting the interview sessions and listening to the insurance leaders speak 
authoritatively and some passionately, in answering to my interview questions, on the 
possibility and indeed the actual realization of corporate governance strategies that 
support financial performance especially when they closely intertwine with value 
creation. 
I realize that the successful completion of a Doctorate study in business is not an 
easy feat. Courage, determination, and the persistent spirit to ebb on even against one's 
will are necessary. There were indeed several times on the academic journey that I 
wanted to quit and opt for the easy way out. I have been frustrated when I could not seem 
to get the script right when I could not adequately and efficiently put into words my 
thoughts as I typed one page after another. Most importantly is the knowledge that it is 
impossible to accomplish the study on my own. I have received invaluable support from 
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each of the faculty especially when I could not keep the end goal in proper view. The 
advice and feedback I have obtained has been valuable and has helped me in 
understanding; I appreciate the need for scholarly writing, which I use in my professional 
work. 
Conclusion 
The insurance industry is in the middle of a modern global marketplace that is 
increasingly complex, dynamic, and has many torrential currents that morph from the 
disruptive forces of new technology, innovation and a grander global connection. 
Equally, the magnitude and scope of risk and uncertainty unleashed on the insurance 
industry continue at such an unprecedented rate. These uncharacteristic times occur in a 
global financial market littered with one occurrence after another of global scandal. The 
insurance market has not been exempted, as in fact, financial scandals have continued to 
mire the insurance business environment in spite the fact that policymakers have vowed 
sweeping changes in the insurance industry to safeguard profits and protect more than a 
million policyholders (Voinea, 2015). The rate and number of global misconduct and 
scandals are indicative of the dire need for a sure solution to sound corporate governance. 
The insurance business leaders need to set strategies for corporate governance to 
support financial performance. The leaders need to reestablish and rewrite the insurance 
business strategy to incorporate a robust system for risk management that would 
comprehensively assess and mitigate risk and reduce any disruptive elements that would 
impede business objective and offer a chance for the delivery of positive business 
performance. The insurance business leaders need to establish an adequate internal 
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control system which would safeguard against financial loss. A robust internal control 
system has the potential to gird against the pitfalls that led to the rise in the spate of 
global corporate scandal. Lastly, the insurance business leaders need to ensure the 
consistent application and compliance with corporate governance principles and 
regulations. The regular and full implementation of the regulations and principles of 
corporate governance considers the needs of all stakeholders and promotes value creation 
for stakeholders and may beneficially affect social change. A comprehensive system of 
sound governance is sure to result in enhanced financial performance and value creation 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Questions 
 
Title of Study: Corporate Governance Strategies to Support Financial 
 Performance 
Name of interview and Position: ___________________________ 
Place:__________Date ____________________Time_________ 
I. Introduce self to participants.  
II. Thank the participants for their time and voluntary intention to participate in the 
study. 
III. Provide interview with overview of the consent form that they have read, signed, 
and sent via post. 
IV. Give the participants a copy of the consent form. 
V. Inform participants of the recording of the interview and note if they will have 
any concerns. 
VI. If in agreement, proceed to turn on the audio recording device.  
VII. Commence with the interview. 
VIII. Carry on with follow-up questions. 
IX. Request and collect hard copy documents and any relevant materials. 
X. Thank the participants again for their time. 
XI. Provide contact details to participants incase prospective questions should arise. 
XII. End the protocol. 
The following are the open-ended questions I will use in the study: 
 
1. Who is responsible for strategic corporate governance within your 
organization? 
2. What strategies were used to ensure sound corporate governance of the 
organization? 
3. What are the strategies used to link strategic corporate governance and the 
internal control systems (ICS) within your organization? 
4. What, if any, related strategies for human resource management are in place to 
curb poor corporate governance? 
5. What strategies used for corporate governance leads to improved financial 
performance? 
6. What measures are in place to enhance compliance toward corporate 
governance? 
7. What additional information can you provide regarding strategies you use for 
corporate governance to support financial performance?  
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